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Abstract
The homes of those in charge of firms are an important source of finance for ongoing busi-
nesses. We use firm level accounting data, transaction level house price data and loan level
residential mortgage data from the UK to show that a £1 increase in the value of the residential
real estate of a firm’s directors increases the firm’s investment and wage bill by £0.03 each.
These effects run through smaller firms and are similar in booms and busts. In aggregate, the
homes of firm directors are worth 80% of GDP. Using this, a back of the envelope calculation
suggests that a 1% increase in real estate prices leads, through this channel, to up to a 0.28%
rise in business investment and a 0.08% rise in total wages paid. We complement this with
evidence on how a firm responds to changes in the value of its own corporate real estate; we find
that, in aggregate, the residential real estate of directors is at least as important for activity.
We use an estimated general equilibrium model to quantify the importance of both types of real
estate for the propagation of shocks to the macroeconomy. JEL Codes: D22, E32, R30.
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1 Introduction
Economic mechanisms that generate a causal link between real estate prices and the macroeconomy
have been a focus of attention in the recent literature. The extant literature pictures this link running
through two main channels. First, households, particularly those that are financially constrained,
use increases in real estate wealth to finance consumption (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Berger et al., 2017).
Second, credit constrained firms use increases in the value of their commercial real estate to finance
investment (Chaney et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013).
This paper explores a mechanism at the intersection of these two channels. The residential wealth
owned by households is an important source of collateral to finance the corporate sector. It is common
for the owners of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to pledge their homes to finance their
firms. The literature has yet to disentangle and quantify the aggregate consequences of this.1 The
macroeconomic implications could be profound: the homes of the households who run firms are
worth 80% of GDP and four times the value of owner occupied corporate real estate. And while
this residential real estate largely supports the financing of smaller enterprises, such enterprises are
responsible for a considerable share of economic activity and business cycle fluctuations.2
We address this issue by using a feature of firm level data in the UK: the persons responsible for
running a firm – known as directors – must declare their residential address to the public registrar.3
By matching this information to transaction level data on residential properties and administrative
data on mortgages, we are able to obtain a time series of the value of each director’s home and
the equity contained within it. Our key microeconometric result is that a £1 increase in the value
of the homes of a firm’s directors leads the average firm in our sample to invest £0.03 more and
1The use of homes as collateral for entrants is explored in Hurst and Lusardi (2004); Corradin and Popov (2015);
Kerr et al. (2015); Schmalz et al. (2017) among others. The evidence of a meaningful effect at the micro level is mixed
and there is little evidence of material consequences for the macroeconomy. However, the link to incumbent firms at
the micro level has not been studied. Adelino et al. (2015) explore this mechanism at the regional level, but do not
distinguish between corporate and residential real estate.
2In the UK, SMEs (<250 employees) are responsible for 52% (42%) of employment (investment). SMEs accounted
for 43% of the fall in employment from 2008-09, and 66% (57%) of the rise in employment (investment) from 2010-14.
Sources: ABS, SME Stats, BPE. SMEs in the OECD account for 60% of employment and 50− 60% of value added on
average (OECD, 2017).
3A director does not just refer to a member of the board of a large firm. Every firm, no matter how small, must have
at least one director. There are 2.8 million active firm directors in the UK. 72% of directors report being shareholders
of their firm.
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spend an additional £0.03 on total wages. The effects of an increase in the total home equity value
of a firm’s directors are the same. These effects appear similar across periods of real estate price
increases and decreases and are also consistent across subsamples for the pre- and post- crisis period.
Intuitively, however, the very largest firms in our sample are insensitive to fluctuations in our measure
of residential real estate values.
Our dataset also allows us to observe corporate real estate holdings on the firm’s own balance
sheet. We can then run a horse race between these two types of real estate. We find that a £1
increase in corporate real estate values leads firms to increase investment by around £0.05 and the
wage bill by £0.03. The magnitude of the investment response is similar to US evidence on listed
firms (Chaney et al., 2012).
We then consider aggregate consequences. At the level of an individual firm a £1 increase in
corporate real estate values has a 70% larger effect on investment than residential real estate. How-
ever, as mentioned, we estimate that the total value of residential real estate held by firm directors is
around four times greater than the total value of owner-occupied corporate real estate.4 The macroe-
conomic consequences of a 1% change in real estate prices should therefore be at least as strong for
residential real estate. A back of the envelope calculation, based on our microeconometric estimates,
suggests that a 1% rise in real estate prices leads to a 0.28% rise in business investment and a 0.08%
rise in total wages paid through the effects of residential real estate, and a respective 0.11% and
0.02% rise for corporate real estate.
Of course, such estimates omit general equilibrium feedback effects. To explore the macroeco-
nomic implications of our channels we build a general equilibrium model featuring credit constrained
entrepreneurs that extends Liu et al. (2013), and estimate the model with Bayesian methods using
aggregate UK time series. We find that in response to a real estate price shock, the peak effect on
the macroeconomy would be about 30% smaller when ignoring residential real estate as a source of
funding for firms.
Our microeconometric estimates rely on two primary sources of variation. First, directors live
4By owner-occupier firms we refer to firms who own the real estate they occupy. Non-owner occupier firms are
those that lease their property from a commercial real estate firm. As a consequence this aggregate number excludes
property owned by real estate firms.
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in homes of differing initial values (and loan-to-value). This implies that a given percentage change
in real estate prices translates into differential changes in home values (and equity) measured in £
terms. Second, around 66% of directors live in a different region from their firm. This generates
regional heterogeneity in the real estate price dynamics that an individual director faces depending
on where he or she is located.
Four different sources of endogeneity may bias our estimates. First, a director’s property purchase
is an endogenous choice that may be related to firm performance (e.g. the director buys a larger
house because the firm is doing well). We address this concern by observing the history of who
has run the firms and where they have lived: we hold the properties and composition of directors
constant by firm at the start of our sample, and rely solely on changes in regional real estate prices
to compute the evolution of our measure of the value of director’s residential real estate.
A second concern is that our regressions are simply detecting how local economic conditions –
which are correlated with real estate prices – are affecting firms. Our regressions include region-
time fixed effects that control for the average effect of the local economy on firm-level behaviour; for
example, through demand. However, if there are factors that cause heterogeneity across firms in their
sensitivity to local economic conditions, and those factors are correlated with the types of properties
that directors own, then this may confound our results. Therefore, we go further in showing: (i)
that firms operating in the manufacturing sector – that produce tradable goods and hence are less
sensitive to the local economy (Mian and Sufi, 2014) – are equally sensitive to our residential real
estate measure; (ii) that the results are similar even if we focus only on directors that live in a different
region (or sufficiently far) from their firm, so that their home values are unaffected by local factors;
and (iii) that we obtain the same result when we construct an instrument for local house prices using
the interaction of aggregate mortgage interest rates with regional supply constraints (similar to, for
example, Chetty et al., 2017). A third linked concern is that firms are able to affect local real estate
prices through their own activity. However, these latter two tests also reveal that this is not driving
our results. As our sample is dominated by small and medium sized companies this concern is also
unlikely to be relevant to our analysis.
A fourth concern is that unobserved director heterogeneity may confound our estimates. When
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we hold the composition of directors fixed, any time invariant director heterogeneity that may be
correlated with the homes the directors have will be absorbed by a firm fixed effect. However,
director-level heterogeneity could lead to differing sensitivities to real estate price fluctuations at
the firm level. For example, older directors could react differently to changes in real estate prices
and own a systematically different type of housing. Alternatively, highly skilled directors may own
bigger homes and may also be better placed to take advantage of opportunities offered by local
economic booms. We address this concern by saturating our model with a large number of director
characteristics (age, gender, experience etc.) and interact them with real estate prices. Crucially,
we can proxy for director skill by assessing the performance of other companies that the director is
part of. This provides a more limited sample, but we can exploit heterogeneity in the composition
of directors across firms to get a sense of their quality.
This relationship between the value of directors’ homes and firm behaviour could be explained
by a number of different mechanisms. It could reflect financial constraints. Alternatively, it could be
explained by directors rebalancing their portfolios towards their firm following an increase in their
real estate wealth.5 Recent studies based on natural experiments that have been able to cleanly
isolate collateral effects from wealth effects have demonstrated the importance of the former (Jensen
et al., 2014; DeFusco, 2017). Furthermore, the literature assessing the strength and direction of such
wealth effects is inconclusive (compare, for instance, the findings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008);
Briggs et al. (2015) and Chetty et al. (2017)). In contrast, other authors have emphasised wealth
effects as the main transmission mechanism from real estate prices to consumption (Kaplan et al.,
2017). Ultimately, however, the exact mechanism is less important for our main contribution. Our
goal is to show that the value of the homes of firm directors affects firm activity and to argue that
this is consequential for understanding how real estate prices affect macroeconomic dynamics.
5Note, as pointed out in Hurst and Lusardi (2004), entrepreneurial jobs may be luxury goods and an increase in
wealth may make households wish to start running a business. This motivation does not apply here: we focus on
directors who are already running a firm and consider how a marginal change in the director’s home value affects the
firm’s behaviour. Similarly, it is not the case that our directors, unlike new entrepreneurs, are starting out on a new
risky venture, although we cannot rule out that some of our results run through changes in risk tolerance as housing
wealth changes.
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Related Literature The aggregate consequences of credit constrained households borrowing against
their homes for consumption was first studied in a quantitative business cycle model by Iacoviello
(2005). There is now a growing body of theoretical work in the macroeconomics literature emphasis-
ing this mechanism.6 Empirically, Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014) document that sharp drops in house
prices contributed to falls in demand in regions where households were highly levered during the
Great Recession in the United States. Albanesi et al. (2016) clarify this story using individual level
data and highlight that regional aggregation can obfuscate relationships at the micro-level. Hurst
and Stafford (2004); Campbell and Cocco (2007); Stroebel and Vavra (2015) all provide empirical
evidence that real estate prices affect local demand through the behaviour of homeowners in peri-
ods outside of crises as well; DeFusco (2017) provides a more comprehensive list of recent empirical
studies in this area. Correspondingly on the firm side, Liu et al. (2013) uses a quantitative model to
show that credit constrained firms who borrow against their real estate amplify the macroeconomic
consequences of disturbances in the housing market. The works of Gan (2007); Chaney et al. (2012);
Kleiner (2013); Cvijanovic (2014) among others provide microeconometric evidence on the various
aspects of the links between real estate prices, firms’ capital structure, collateral and firm activity.
We complement these literatures by showing that the value of residential real estate matters for
firm behaviour and hence for the supply side of the economy. We quantify this effect at the firm level
and explore the aggregate consequences in a business cycle model.
The link between house prices and start-up rates has been explored in the entrepreneurship liter-
ature. Some authors have found that rising house prices do enable previously collateral constrained,
fledgling entrepreneurs to start new firms (Corradin and Popov, 2015 and Schmalz et al., 2017).
Others have argued that the relationships between house prices and entry reflect other mechanisms
(local demand, wealth effects) and that residential real estate is not key to unlocking entrepreneur-
ship (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Kerr et al., 2015).7 Even those that do find a link at the micro-level
find that aggregate consequences are limited (for example, Schmalz et al. (2017) finds that a 19%
increase in house prices raises total employment by 0.16% through new firm creation). Our analysis
6See for example Justiniano et al. (2015); Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017); Favilukis et al. (2017).
7Bracke et al. (2015) demonstrate theoretically in a model with mortgage debt that housing wealth could be either
positively or negatively associated with entrepreneurship.
6
differs in that we look at how residential real estate values affect existing enterprises on an ongoing
basis.8 Moreover, we find that our mechanism is just as relevant for mature firms, and the effects are
strong enough to influence macroeconomic dynamics.
Adelino et al. (2015) is an exception in that they are the first to argue that residential real estate
prices have an aggregate effect through the behaviour of small firms and start-ups. Their key finding
is that relative regional employment in small firms in certain industries is more sensitive to local house
prices. Our analysis differs in a number of respects. Most importantly, we conduct our analysis at
the firm level rather than the regional level and can identify both the value of the homes of directors
and the firms own real estate holdings: this circumvents a number of identification issues.
The corporate finance literature has long recognised the importance of personal property as
sources of collateral in the business loan market (Berger and Udell 1995; Avery et al. 1998; Jimenez
and Saurina 2004; Berkowitz and White 2004; Brick and Palia 2007; Davydenko and Franks 2008;
Ono and Uesugi 2009). However, the attention has focused on when and why such collateral is used.
Our contribution is to quantify how changes in the value of residential real estate affects firm activity
and consequently the aggregate economy.
Structure of the Paper The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides
some background on the link between the residential real estate of firm directors and corporate
borrowing. Section 3 presents the construction of the data and summary statistics. Section 4 explains
our methodology and regression design. Section 5 presents the main results and robustness checks.
Section 6 considers macroeconomic consequences. Section 7 concludes.
2 Home Values and Corporate Borrowing
From the perspective of the macroeconomics literature, perhaps the most intuitive way for residential
real estate to be used to fund a firm is via home equity extraction. In our case, this would mean that
the firm’s director remortgages their home and uses the funds to inject new equity into the business.
8Schmalz et al. (2017) also assess how the home values of entrepreneurs affects the subsequent performance of
start-ups. But the scope of their research does not extend to mature firms and the effect of changes in home values
after the firm has started.
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In practice, the more common way to fund a firm through housing wealth is for the firm to take out
a loan which the director guarantees by pledging personal assets, including their house. In effect,
the director contracts away some right to limited liability in order to increase their firm’s borrowing
capacity. In the UK this is advantageous in the sense that the firm’s tax shield is then transferred
to the director.
These “personal” or “directors” guarantees can be secured directly on a property. However, even
if a director’s home does not explicitly secure a guarantee, it can still implicitly back it because if a
director fails to fulfill a personal guarantee, the creditor can obtain a court order to seize the director’s
house (see Field-Fisher-Waterhouse (2012)). Guarantees for firm directors are also typically joint and
several (see Riches and Allen (2009), page 84). Lenders can seize the assets of any and all directors
in order to recoup the amount owed. This motivates our specification below where we use the value
of the total real estate holdings across directors for our empirical analysis.9
To illustrate the prevalence of residential real estate and personal guarantees as security for cor-
porate loans in the UK, we present evidence from two surveys. First, from the borrowers perspective,
the UK Survey of SME Finance covering 2,500 enterprises with less than 250 employees, asks (in
reference to firms that say they have a loan) “What security was used to get this loan/mortgage?”.10
Our second source, from the lenders perspective, is the Bank of England’s 2015 survey of UK SME
and Mid-Corporate Lending. This survey covered outstanding loans at the 5 major UK banks to
businesses borrowing at least £250 thousand, and whose annual revenue was no more than £500
million. The survey asks “Does your bank hold any of the following as collateral?”. In both surveys
the respondent can give multiple responses.
Table 1 summarises the evidence from the surveys on the prevalence of different types of security
for business loans in the UK. First, note that it is very common for a loan to be secured explicitly
on property; this occurs in 79% of cases in the borrowers’ survey (panel A) and 73% of cases in the
lenders’ survey (panel B). More relevant for our purposes is that 42% of SMEs report their loans
9In the UK, banks face stringent legal barriers to seizing the share of a family home that is owned by a spouse
who is not part of the business (see Royal Bank of Scotland plc versus Etridge (No 2), 2011). Hence, while we do sum
twice over the same home for directors who are husband and wife, this is actually appropriate as twice as much of any
equity is available to be pledged.
10We combine the 2004 and 2008 waves. Responses are weighted to match the population of UK firms by size and
sector as measured by administrative data.
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were either explicitly secured through residential real estate or via a personal guarantee (panel A,
Column 2). For comparison, 44% of borrowers report using their firm’s building as security. In the
lenders survey we are unable to distinguish loans secured directly on residential property from those
secured on other property (including the firm’s buildings) but the survey reports that 29% of loans
have a personal guarantee attached (panel B, Column 2).
The prevalence of this sort of security is decreasing in firm size.11 Nonetheless, 25% of loans to
firms with more than 250 employees still have a personal guarantee attached. An explanation for this
may be the signaling value of a guarantee: personal wealth, particularly residential wealth, has more
value to the borrower than the lender. Costly collateral pledging could help offset adverse selection
problems (see Coco (2000) for a discussion) even if the amount of personal assets pledged is small
relative to the loan size.
In the lenders survey, loans secured with a personal guarantee are not obviously smaller. The
median sizes of loans with and without a guarantee are £550 thousand and £535 thousand, although
the 90th percentile of loan size is £3.2 million for loans with a guarantee and £4.0 million for loans
without. However, the same is not true in the borrowers survey: guaranteed loans and those secured
on residential property have a median size of £80 thousand compared to £130 thousand for other
loans. The borrowers’ survey also contains information on the value of the security. Hence, we can
compute an implicit loan-to-value (LTV) ratio:12 loans that are uniquely secured by a guarantee or
residential real estate have a median LTV of 65%. This is identical to the median LTV of other loans
suggesting no meaningful difference in pledgeability.
The UK survey evidence is that residential real estate is an important source of collateral for
firms, particularly SMEs. However, we use UK data due to its reporting standards for directors
rather than anything specific about its corporate loan market. The use of residential assets and
personal guarantees as a security for corporate loans is wide-spread across the world including in
the United States. Appendix C provides cross-country evidence on the prevalence of guarantees as
11Note that the 12% figure for personal guarantees for firms with 0-1 employees in panel 2 is misleading. Such firms
are typically sole-traders and have no limited liability or no separation of assets. Rather than use personal guarantees
such enterprises use explicit security. This is apparent in the borrowers survey: no firm with 0-1 employee reports
using a personal guarantee.
12We use the question “What was the value of this security when the loan/mortgage was obtained?”.
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security for corporate loans.
[Table 1 here]
In light of this section, it is also useful to lay out a limitation to our analysis. Despite having
access to data on individual mortgages, we do not observe guaranteed loans in our data as they often
do not involve an explicit mortgage. Still, as we demonstrate below, there is an empirical relationship
between the value of real estate held by a firm’s directors and the firm’s borrowing.
3 Data
We use accounting data on firms from England, Wales, and Scotland covering the period 2002-2014,
merged with transaction-level house price data and loan-level mortgage data.
3.1 Data Sources
3.1.1 Firm Data - Bureau van Dijk
Our firm level data for the UK is sourced from a large micro dataset of firms’ financial accounts,
including annual balance sheet, income and cash flow statements, provided by Bureau van Dijk
(BvD). This is a commercial database whose raw source are the publicly available filings of each firm
at Companies House, the registrar of companies in the UK. The database contains information on
approximately 4.8 million unique private and public firms, covering much of the corporate universe
of the UK.13 Our baseline sample is a fraction of the size of the full database as many firms are not
required to report all the variables we use in our specification. However, our main result still holds
when using a different regression design with the largest available sample.
Firm Directors BvD also provide information on firm directors. These are the individuals legally
responsible for running the firm and who have a duty to promote its success. All registered firms,
no matter how small, must have at least one director.14 Under UK law, all directors must provide
13Unincorporated sole traders are not included in the dataset.
14Firms can themselves be directors, but every firm must have at least one director who is a natural person.
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Companies House with information including their full name, full date of birth (including year of
birth), nationality, and their appointment and resignation dates as a director at the firm. Directors
are also required to report their residential address. We use a director’s first initial, surname and full
date of birth to identify directors across firms and different vintages of the BvD data.
In the database, 72% of directors report being shareholders in their firm at some point.15 However,
this variable is not universally reported and a missing value is not equivalent to a negative response.
So the share of directors who are shareholders is unclear. For small firms (like those in our sample),
the directors will also typically be shareholders of the firm so there is reason to believe the share is
higher (director guarantee and personal guarantee are used synonymously for this reason). Our main
empirical results are unaffected when we condition on the share of directors who are known to be
shareholders.
Use of Historical Vintages BvD is a live database. This leads to several limitations. First, the
firm ownership structure (e.g. whether the firm is part of a group) is only accurate at the time of
access and not for historical observations. Second, firm that die appear to exit the database after five
years.16 Third, the historical information based on past filed accounts has significantly more missing
data than the most recent filings. Fourth, and most importantly, BvD holds live information on
who the firm’s directors are and where they currently live, but the database does not have historical
information on these variables.
To circumvent these issues, we use archived vintages of the database, sampled approximately every
six months, to capture information when it was first published. This substantially improves data
coverage, allows us to observe the birth and death of companies, and provides accurate information on
the status of directors at the time the accounts were filed. As discussed in great detail Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2015) and implemented in Gopinath et al. (forthcoming), the use of archival information and
careful treatment of the data is crucial to construct an accurate firm level panel using data provided
by BvD. Furthermore, for our purposes, the use of historical vintages of BvD data is what makes our
15Across firm-director-year observations the number is 65% as some directors only report being shareholders in
certain years.
16For example, only 60% of companies that filed accounts in 2002 are still present in the 2015 BvD vintage (see
Online Appendix A).
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empirical strategy possible by providing historical information on who firm directors were and where
they lived at the time the firm accounts were filed. In Online Appendix A, we discuss our procedure
in great detail and the corresponding advantages it brings in terms of data coverage.
3.1.2 Real Estate Price Data - Land Registries
Our primary source of house price data is the Land Registry’s Price Paid dataset, which covers the
universe of residential property transactions in England and Wales since 1995 (approximately 20
million). The analogous dataset on property transactions for Scotland is provided by the Registers
of Scotland. These datasets have two main uses. First, they are used by the Registries to construct
monthly repeat sales real estate price indices for 204 British regions (respectively, 172 regions in
England and Wales and for 32 in Scotland). Second, we match the transaction level information
in the datasets to the addresses of directors in BvD in order to value directors’ homes at the point
of purchase/sale. The England and Wales Land Registry also contains information on whether the
property was purchased with a mortgage. This is used, along with the mortgage information discussed
next, to calculate the equity a director holds in their house.
3.1.3 Mortgage Data - Product Sales Database
Administrative data on UK residential mortgages are taken from the Product Sales Database (PSD)
provided by the UK Financial Conduct Authority.17 We use data on the flow of mortgages, which
contains information on the terms of virtually all regulated residential mortgages since 2005 at orig-
ination.18 Crucially, the mortgage dataset includes the full postcode of the property the mortgage
is secured against and the date of birth of the borrower. As these variables are also present for firm
directors, we can match directors to their mortgages. As there is an average of 17 properties per
postcode in the UK, the combination of full postcode and date of birth will identify unique individ-
uals with a low probability of a mismatch. Coupled with the data on the value of directors’ homes,
17The FCA Product Sales Data include regulated mortgage contracts only, and therefore exclude other regulated
home finance products such as home purchase plans and home reversions, and unregulated products such as second
charge lending and buy-to-let mortgages.
18Refinancing is only recorded where there is an increase in mortgage principal, or there is no increase in principal
but the refinancing occurs with a different mortgage provider.
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we use the mortgage information to calculate the value of the equity in the house.
3.2 Measuring Real Estate Holdings
For the purposes of our empirical analysis, an immediate concern regarding identification is that
the choice of real estate holdings both by directors and firms will be endogenous to the economic
environment and firm performance. For example, the firm could invest in real estate in anticipation
of future growth or the director could buy a bigger home when the firm is doing well. To solve this
potential endogeneity issue, we follow the corporate finance literature and rely on fluctuations in the
price of real estate rather than the quantity of real estate owned – the intensive margin of collateral
in the terminology of Benmelech and Bergman (2009). Specifically, we fix the composition of real
estate holdings (the buildings the firm has and the home where the director lives) at the start of the
sample in 2002 and then use the local real estate price index to value real estate holdings throughout
the rest of the sample.
The identification of our channels of interest then relies on ensuring that: (i) there are not omitted
factors that govern the sensitivity of a firm to real estate prices that are correlated with our measure
of initial real estate holdings; and (ii) the firm itself is unable to influence real estate prices. We
discuss these issues in Section 4.2.
Corporate Real Estate To measure corporate real estate, we use the balance sheet item “Land
and Buildings” from BvD. Specifically, the variable CorporateREi,t, for firm i at time t ≥ 2002 in
region j is given by:19
CorporateREi,t = LBi,2002LPj,t, (3.1)
where LBi,2002 is the book value of “Land and Buildings” in 2002 and LPj,t is the local real estate price
index in region j at time t (with the normalisation LPj,2002 = 1).20 A firm’s region is defined as the
19Note that while our firm level data is annual, firms’ accounts refer to different dates in the year based on the
timing of their fiscal year end. Our real estate price data is monthly and when we use price indices to construct our
variables we use the index observed in the month the accounts were filed.
20Our results are robust to different ways of calculating corporate real estate holdings including: (i) using a com-
mercial real estate price index rather than a house price index and (ii) replacing the 2002 book value of "Land and
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one where its “R/O [Registered Office] Address” is located. BvD lists all addresses where a firm has
operations (“Trading Addresses”). In Appendix A.1 we show that our results are robust to separating
out firms with all addresses located in a single region.
Directors’ Residential Real Estate We explain our methodology to value directors’ homes in
greater detail in Online Appendix C, which includes diagnostics of the matching algorithm and details
of all the assumptions made when computing this variable.21 However, director real estate holdings
is the key variable in our analysis and we highlight the key steps in its construction here.
The addresses of firm directors are recorded as an unstructured string of text in the BvD database,
with the notable exception of the director’s postcode, which is also recorded in a separate field. We
use an algorithm that searches the unstructured address strings for regular expressions to determine
the director’s house number/house name and (if applicable) flat number/flat name. These two bits
of information, coupled with the postcode, are sufficient to uniquely identify a property in the UK.
We match the cleaned director’s address to the Land Registry and find the date and price of every
transaction at that property since 1995. The director’s purchase (sale) price of the property is the
first transaction before (after) the director first (last) lists the address in the BvD database.22 For
properties where there is no transaction in the Land Registry, we use the valuation of the property
at the time of the earliest observed remortgage, if applicable. We then estimate the value of the
property at dates away from the relevant transaction/remortgage using the local house price index.
Our measure of total directors’ residential real estate for firm i at time t is then given by
Residential REi,t =
Ni
(N˜i)
N˜i∑
d=1
Ldi,2002L
P
hd,t
, (3.2)
where Ldi,2002 is the estimated home value of director d working at firm i in 2002, and LPhd,t is the
Buildings" in (3.1) with the 2002 market value, calculated through a Last In, First Out (LIFO) recursive method
(Hayashi and Inoue, 1991). See Appendix A.1 for details.
21In Online Appendix C, we also discuss changes in legal requirements for directors to report their address. From
October 2009, directors had the option to ask Companies House not to make their address publicly available. This
has no impact on our analysis as we can still see where the director lived in 2002 since the law was not imposed
retrospectively and we have historical data prior to 2009. Regardless, we show that stopping our sample in 2008 does
not affect our results.
22When the purchase price is observed, we rely solely on it as it is independent of behaviour and information revealed
in future. However, if no purchase transaction is recorded (because the property was bought before 1995), then we use
the sale price.
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regional house price index of the region hd where the director lives in 2002.23
We are often unable to value the homes of all directors. This will occur if we fail to either match
the property to the transactions level database or if we do not observe a remortgage.24 In total,
we are able to match and value 58% of director addresses (see Online Appendix C for details); this
number rises to 65% for directors at our baseline sample of firms. In Equation 3.2, the term Ni is
then the total number of directors at firm i and N˜i is the number of matched directors. Essentially,
we first calculate the average of Ldi,2002LPhd,t across matched directors then multiply that figure by the
total number of directors. This means that we can include firms where not every director is matched
in our sample and abstract from differences in the match rate between firms.
For firms within the same region, there is a single source of variation to identify the effects of
changes in corporate real estate values: the differences in the initial value of real estate owned by
the firm LBi,2002. In contrast, Residential REi,t varies across firms because the initial value of director
homes (Ldi,2002) differs but also because directors can live in different regions from their firm, and so
LPhd,t 6= LPj,t. Furthermore, the number of directors (Ni) can also vary across firms. In Appendix B we
explore the relative importance of these different sources of variation in Residential REi,t and find
that variation in Ldi,2002 drives most of our results.
Directors’ Residential Equity A concern with using our residential real estate measure is that
directors may have levered their homes to a different extent and therefore may have different levels
of housing wealth, holding the home value constant. To correct for this, we use our mortgage data
to estimate the value of director home equity. This comes at the cost of observations (we must
see a director sign a new mortgage) and raises measurement issues as the first mortgage contract is
observed at different (potentially endogenous) dates for each director. However, we use this series
as an additional robustness check replacing our baseline Residential REi,t measure. We discuss the
details of this estimation in Online Appendix D. Here, we provide only a brief summary of our
23The same director may hold multiple properties at the same time. If two or more properties are recorded in BvD
(e.g. if the director lists a different address at two different firms where the director holds an appointment), then we
value both properties separately and compute the total.
24Manual checks on our matching algorithm revealed that in 86% of cases a failure to match a director’s address to
the transactions database was due to the address not having a recorded transaction in the Land Registry since 1995.
The remaining 14% were due to a combination of errors in how the address was recorded (typos etc.) or the director
recording a non-residential address.
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method.
We make use of the terms of the mortgage from the PSD dataset.25 We use the details of the first
observable mortgage contract for each director and calculate the evolution of the principle through
time assuming no further remortgages. This assumption is to avoid potential endogeneity issues
that may arise from subsequent mortgage decisions of firm directors being correlated with their
firm’s performance. By relying, effectively, on variation in the intensive margin of equity values,
this approach is analogous to the estimation of our corporate and residential real estate measures.
The variable Residential Equityi,t estimates the total value of this measure across all firm directors,
based on the average equity for each matched director and the total number of directors.
3.3 Additional Calculations
Directors’ Home Ownership Throughout our analysis we maintain the assumption that a di-
rector owns their home. This is an approximation, but there are three pieces of evidence to suggest
that the vast majority of directors are homeowners. First, the 2011 UK census shows that 88% of
individuals with occupation “managers, directors, and senior officials”, and located in the same age
group as the median director in our sample, own the home they live in. Second, in the Registers of
Scotland dataset, the names of buyers are recorded. We cross-checked the surnames of all directors
matched to a Scottish transaction with the surname of the home buyer, making no correction for
typos, and found they matched in 83% of cases. The equivalent data is not available directly in
the England and Wales Land Registry dataset. However, as a third piece of evidence, we randomly
sampled 100 matched directors living in England and Wales and manually inspected the address’
title deed (which includes the names of owners).26 We found that 90 of the 100 directors owned the
home they lived in, and a further two appeared to be owned by family members of the director.
Geographical Distance Between Directors’ and Firms’ Real Estate We measure the dis-
tance between the firm’s location and each matched director’s address by using the UK grid reference
25Where the director’s property is not matched to the PSD, but is matched to the Land Registry, and the latter
indicates the property was bought without a mortgage, the director’s home equity is simply calculated as the home
value (i.e. 100% equity).
26Individual title deeds for any address are available for purchase from the Land Registry for a cost of £3.
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(measured to the nearest metre) for each location’s full postcode. We then convert the grid reference
into a global latitude and longitude pair. From there it is straightforward to calculate the relevant
ellipsoidal distance as the crow flies. At the firm level we calculate the average distance for all of the
firm’s directors.
3.4 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
Our sample focuses on private limited and public quoted firms and follows the literature in excluding
firms that operate in certain industries.27 We also exclude companies that have a parent with an
ownership stake greater than 50%. This is to ensure that the accounts used have the highest degree of
consolidation possible, to prevent the double counting of subsidiaries and to ensure that the financial
position of the firm is correctly accounted for. In our regression analysis, we drop observations which
are missing data on our measures of firm activity (investment, wages and employment), financing
variables (issued equity, directors loans and short and long term debt), the control variables, and our
measures of residential and corporate real estate holdings (as defined above). This leaves us with,
in our baseline sample, 32,244 firm year observations covering 6,431 unique firms. The exact sample
size for each specification is reported in the regression tables.
All accounting variables that enter our regressions, including real estate holdings, are scaled using
the previous accounting year’s “Turnover” as the scaling variable.28 To prevent outliers distorting
the results, all ratios are winsorized at the median plus minus five times the interquartile range.29
27Specifically we exclude companies of the following types: “Economic European Interest Grouping”, “Guarantee”,
“Industrial/Provident”, “Limited Liability Partnership”, “Not companies Act”, “Other”, “Royal Charter”, “Unlim-
ited”, “Public Investment Trust”, thereby ensuring that our sample contains only limited liability companies to which
the Companies Act applies. In addition, we exclude from the sample firms operating in mining (UK 2003 Standard
Industrial Classification [SIC] codes 1010-1450), utilities (UK 2003 sic codes 4011-4100), construction (UK 2003 sic
codes 4511-4550), finance and insurance (UK 2003 sic codes 6511-6720), real estate (UK 2003 sic codes 7011-7032),
and public administration (UK 2003 sic codes 7511-7530).
28Alternatively, we could have followed Chaney et al. (2012) in using property plant and equipment as the scaling
variable. However, unlike their dataset, ours is not limited to listed and relatively large firms, but includes a large
number of small firms with potentially small amounts of fixed assets. The choice of “Turnover” as a scaling variable
is therefore better suited to our sample, and avoids placing too much weight on smaller firms with small holdings of
fixed assets. One variable with different weighting is “Number of Employees”. As “Number of Employees” is a real
variable we compute real turnover as the scaling variable by dividing nominal “Turnover” by the UK consumer price
index with 2005 as a base year. Estimates for the employment regression therefore correspond to 2005 prices.
29This follows Chaney et al. (2012). Our results are robust to winsorizing these variables at the 5/95% level. An
exception is the changes in firm liabilities and employment, where the interquartile range is near to or equal to zero.
For these variables we use a 2/98% winsorisation.
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Table 2 presents summary statistics on variables of interest for our sample of firms. The median
values of “Turnover”, “Total Assets” and “Number of Employees” in the whole sample are about
£12.0 million, £8 million and 107, respectively. The equivalent mean values are greater indicating
a left skew in the distribution typical of firm level data. By UK categorisations, our median firm is
a medium sized enterprise (50 - 249 employees). Small firms (less than 50 employees) form roughly
the lower quartile of our sample while large firms (at least 250 employees) form the upper quartile.
The median firm has four directors and between them they own homes worth about £2.1 million.
In contrast the median firm’s own real estate holdings are only £1.1 million. This suggests that
residential real estate outweighs corporate real estate as a possible source of financing for the firms
in our sample. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the relative importance of the two types of real estate
depends on the size of the firm. For relatively small firms, residential real estate is large compared
to the size of the balance sheet; this is in contrast to corporate real estate. This pattern reverses for
larger firms. The explanation is that the home values of a firm’s directors do not scale proportionately
with the firm’s size, whereas the value of the firm’s own real estate tends to be a relatively stable
share of assets (excepting the very smallest firms). The crossing point for the relative importance of
the two types of real estate is at a firm size of 250 employees, which is exactly the UK threshold for
a SME.
[Figure 1 here]
[Table 2 here]
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the directors of the firms in our sample. The median
director in our sample is 52 years old, has spent 18 cumulative years working as a director and has
held positions across 3 different industries. This serves to highlight that our directors are experienced
and reemphasises again that our results are not driven by new firms run by first time entrepreneurs.
This is in contrast to the literature on real estate values and start ups that focuses on the switch to
entrepreneurship.
18
The median director also owns a house worth £600 thousand, which is considerably more than
the average UK house price over our sample period of £160 thousand (from the UK House Price
Index by the Land Registry). Note also that two thirds of directors live in a different region from
their firm and the median director lives 11 miles away from their firm. The latter is in line with the
10 miles that the average UK worker has to travel to work (from the 2011 UK census). However,
there is a tail of over a quarter of directors who live more than 30 miles away from their firm. We use
these individuals to identify a group of firms where the directors’ home values will not be affected by
real estate prices in the vicinity of the firm.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Regression Specification
Our baseline regression estimates the impact of residential real estate values on firm investment. For
firm i, operating in region j, in industry l, at date t, we estimate the following model:
Investmenti,t = αi+δj,t+µl,t+η×Residential REi,t+β×CorporateREi,t+γ×controlsi,t+εi,t. (4.1)
We define firm investment, Investmenti,t, as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”. The
two real estate measures are (i) Residential REi,t – the total value of residential real estate held
by firm i’s directors, as defined in Equation 3.2 and (ii) CorporateREi,t – the value of commercial
real estate owned directly by firm i, as defined in Equation 3.1. The terms αi, δj,t and µl,t capture
firm fixed effects, region-time fixed effects and industry-time fixed effects respectively. The standard
errors in (4.1) are clustered at the level of the firm’s region.
As is standard in firm level investment regressions (see, for example, Hubbard (1998)), controlsi,t
includes measures of cash flow. We include two specific variables in this context: (i) from the income
statement: Profiti,t (“Operating Profit”) as a proxy for cash generated and (ii) from the balance
sheet: Cashi,t (“Bank Deposits” less “Bank Overdrafts”) to measure liquid assets on hand. Both
regressors enter the regression lagged by one period. A proxy for Tobin’s Q, such as the firm book-to-
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market ratio, is also typically included as a control variable; however, as our dataset includes mainly
private firms, this is not observable. Instead, similar to Catherine et al. (2017), we include 2-digit
industry-time fixed effects, µl,t, to capture changes in investment opportunities for industries.
As mentioned, all these variables, including our estimates of real estimate holdings, enter our
regressions as ratios to the lag of firm “Turnover”. This implies the estimates of η and β have a £
per £ interpretation. However, Residential REi,t does not scale naturally with firm size. To prevent
any spurious correlation arising from this, we include 1/Turnoveri,t−1 as an additional control.
4.2 Identification
At this stage it is informative to consider issues that may affect the identification of η and how
these have been addressed by our regression design. Consider the terms in Equation 3.2. The initial
value of directors’ homes, Ldi,2002, may well be correlated with omitted factors that govern the firm’s
behaviour, but this is a time invariant term that is absorbed by the fixed effect αi. The same applies
to the number of directors and matched directors, respectively Ni and N˜i; further, we show in Online
Appendix C that there is little systematic difference between matched and unmatched directors. It
may be that LPhd,t is correlated with the firm’s real estate price index (L
P
j,t). In turn LPj,t could affect
the firm’s investment opportunities; for example, because an increase in local real estate prices fuels
local consumption (Mian and Sufi, 2011). Region-time fixed effects, δj,t, will partially address this.
However, we also add as an additional control, LPj,t, the price index in the month that the firm files
its account to control for any effects of real estate prices due to differences in a firm’s fiscal year end.
This combination of fixed effects and controls is sufficient to account for the average effect of real
estate prices and of any time invariant director characteristics on firm behaviour. However, there is
still the potential for omitted variation at the director-level that both determines the sensitivity of
the firm to real estate prices and is correlated with the type of property the director inhabits (Ldi,2002).
For example, it could be that firms with older directors are more conservative in the face of local
business cycle (and hence real estate price) fluctuations. Or that more skillful directors are better
able to take advantage of the opportunities presented by expansions, and also own more expensive
houses. To address this, in our baseline specification, we augment our control set with other observed
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characteristics of the firm’s directors interacted with LPj,t. Specifically, for each firm we compute in
2002 the following: (i) the average age of directors; (ii) the share of directors who are male; (iii) the
share of directors who have a non-UK nationality; (iv) the average number of firms each director
works for and (v) has ever worked for; (vi) the average number of industries each director has worked
in; (vii) the average length of experience (defined as time since first appointment) that each director
has (across all the firms the director has worked for); (viii) the average number of firms the directors
have resigned from; (ix) the average number of firms that each director has been a part of at birth
and (x) the average number of firms each director has worked for that have died. Additional detail on
the calculation of these variables is presented in Online Appendix B. For each of these 10 variables,
we then place each firm into one of 5 quintiles based on where they sit in the 2002 distribution and
include the interaction of the quintile dummies with LPj,t in controlsi,t.
As an additional robustness check, separate from our baseline, we exploit the fact that some
directors hold directorships at more than one firm at a time. For this subset of directors we are
able to calculate an additional proxy for their skill: the average growth rate in “Total Assets” in
other firms that they are a director of. This is a more limited sample, and the critical source of
variation is then different, but overlapping, combinations of directors across firms. However, the
variable is advantageous in that it is based on realised information of firm performance rather than
just director characteristics.30 We place firms into one of 5 quintiles based on where they sit in the
annual distribution of this average asset growth variable and include the interaction of these quintile
dummies with LPj,t as additional controls.
An analogous problem exists regarding corporate real estate: LBi,2002 is correlated with firm level
characteristics like size and age that may alter how a firm responds to shifts in real estate prices. We
address this in a similar fashion. Following Chaney et al. (2012), we include in controlsi,t dummy
variables for which quintile of the 2002 size (measured by “Total Assets”), age and return on assets
(measured by “Operating Profits” over “Total Assets”) distributions the firm sits in, interacted with
30Specifically, let Fd be the set of all firms where individual d holds directorships. Further, for firm i, let
Nˆi ≥ 0 be the total number of directors at firm i who also hold directorships in other firms. Finally, let
TotalAssetsf,t be the level of “Total Assets” at firm f at time t. Our skill proxy for firm i is then given by
1
Nˆi
∑Nˆi
d=1
1
|Fd\{i}|
∑
f∈Fd\{i}
(
∆TotalAssetsf,t
TotalAssetsf,t−1
)
. In words, we take the average asset growth at each director’s other
companies and then average this at the firm level. In our sample two thirds of firms have at least one director who
has a directorship in another company elsewhere in the UK (not necessarily in our regression sample).
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LPj,t.
Our findings could still be confounded if our real estate measures are correlated with other omitted
factors that govern the sensitivity of the firm to local economic conditions or if the behaviour of
an individual firm is enough to influence those conditions. To address this, we alter our baseline
regression along three dimensions.
First, we recompute our residential real estate measure using information only from directors who
live in different regions from the firm (we treat directors living in the same region as unmatched).
This means that the local real estate prices are not used in the construction of the variable. Our
regions can still be confined in relatively small geographical areas (there are 33 regions in London for
instance). Hence, as an additional check, we also consider how the distance between the directors’
homes and the firm’s location affects our results.
Second, we consider if there is a differential response for firms who operate in the manufacturing
sector, where output is tradable and local demand effects should be irrelevant (Mian and Sufi, 2014).
Third, we construct an instrument for regional real estate prices by using the strategy adopted
by Mian and Sufi (2011), Chaney et al. (2012) and Chetty et al. (2017) among others. Specifically,
we instrument for local real estate prices by interacting local geographical constraints on housing
supply with aggregate shifts in the interest rate on 2-year 75%-LTV mortgages.31 When mortgage
rates fall, the demand for real estate rises. The intuition behind our instrument is: if local housing
supply is very inelastic, then increased demand will translate mostly into higher prices rather than
more housing. Our measure of local housing supply constraints is the share of all developable land
that was developed in 1990. The data are from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) who originally derived
the measure from the Land Cover Map of Great Britain using satellite images, allocating land to 25
cover types on a 25 meter grid.32 We thus estimate, for region k, at date t, the following first-stage
regression to predict house prices:
LPk,t = b0k + b1t + b2 × constraintsk × rt + ukt, (4.2)
31This was the most standard mortgage product in the UK during our sample.
32The data covers England (excluding the local authorities in Scotland and Wales), so we only include 150 local
authorities in our regressions using the instrumented series.
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where constraintsk measures constraints on land supply at the regional level while rt is the nation-
wide mortgage rate at monthly frequency. The terms b0k and b1t are region and time fixed effects
respectively. Region specific shocks to real estate prices, some of which are potentially due to the
behaviour of the firm, are contained in ukt. Since ukt contains the terms we wish to abstract from, we
can generate an instrumented house price index using the fitted values from Equation 4.2, LˆPk,t. We
then replace LˆPk,t = LPh,t for k = h in Equation 3.2 and replace LˆPk,t = LPj,t for k = j in Equation 3.1 as
well as in all the variables in controlsi,t containing LPj,t. The results from this regression are available
in Appendix A.3: the estimate on b2 is highly significant and has the intuitive negative sign.33
5 Main Results
5.1 Main Results
Table 4 reports our estimates for alternative specifications of Equation 4.1. The fourth column in
the table presents our baseline specification. The coefficient on residential real estate suggests that
a £1 rise in the total value of the residential real estate holdings of a firm’s directors causes the
firm’s investment to increase by around £0.03. Equivalently, the coefficient on corporate real estate
suggests that every £1 increase in the value of the firm’s own real estate holdings causes a £0.05
increase in investment (for comparison, Chaney et al. (2012) report a figure of $0.06 associated with
a $1 increase in the value of corporate real estate). At the firm level, this implies that corporate real
estate has a 70% stronger impact on investment than residential real estate. However, as discussed
in the Introduction, the total value of director real estate for the economy as a whole is 4 times larger
than the real estate held by owner-occupying firms, suggesting the aggregate effect on investment
through residential real estate is potentially larger. The estimates are robust to perturbations in the
specification. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show that the £0.03 coefficient on residential real estate
is, for the most part, unaffected by altering the control set or the degree of fixed effect saturation.
33As discussed in Adelino et al. (2015), this style of instrument may be weak when house prices fall. A drop in
demand does not lead to a destruction of the existing housing stock. However, note that, in contrast to the US, the
UK did not experience a major nationwide fall in house prices in the crisis period. As a result, in our sample, house
prices are rising in 75% of our firm-year observations.
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[Table 4 here]
Comparing Columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 4, one can see that the estimated coefficients on
residential real estate and corporate real estate are a little diminished when the other type of real
estate is controlled for. However, the relevant Coefficients in columns (5) and (6) are still within a
standard error of the baseline estimate. This implies that existing estimates in the literature on the
impact of corporate real estate are unlikely to be suffering from bias due to the omission of residential
real estate from their specifications.
5.2 Measurement and Identification
Table 5 presents robustness tests that relate to the measurement of our variables of interest and our
sample selection.
Firms may revalue their property when prices increase, generating an automatic correlation be-
tween our measure of investment and real estate prices that we do not wish to capture. Alternatively,
some firms may invest in property for speculative purposes when prices rise. This may explain the
sensitivity between investment and both real estate measures. To address this, we rerun our baseline
specification using investment excluding the change in the book value of “Land and Buildings” as
the dependent variable. Column (2) of Table 5 presents the results. As can be seen, corporate and
residential real estate still both influence investment in other forms of fixed assets. Furthermore, as
we discuss in Section 5.4, firms also hire more workers in response to an increase in the value of both
types of real estate.
As described in Section 3.1.1 we are unable to say definitively that a director is not also a share-
holder. However, in Columns (3,4) of Table 6, we re-estimate our baseline specification, interacting
our residential real estate measure with a dummy variable indicating whether or not at least 50% of
directors report being shareholders. There is a very similar coefficient on residential real estate for
both types of firms, but the point estimates are slightly greater when a greater fraction of directors
report being shareholders.
[Table 5 here]
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As discussed in Section 3.2, defining our residential real estate measure using home values ignores
the fact that directors have differing amounts of equity contained within their home. In Column (5),
we substitute Residential REi,t with Residential Equityi,t. This leaves us with fewer observations;
however, the coefficient estimates are again comparable.
These results are all conditional on a particular sample of firms who report the necessary informa-
tion for us to compute our dependent variables and controls. Since reporting requirements vary by
firm size and firms can still voluntarily choose to report information, we do not have a representative
random sample. Furthermore, we have not used the information that is available for millions of firms
in the dataset. To address this, in Column (6) of Table 5 we estimate a specification which gives us
the largest possible sample. Specifically, we make use of the fact that the variable “Total Assets”
is near universally reported in our database. Our dependent variable is then the change in “Total
Assets” (as opposed to the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”), and we scale all variables
by lagged “Total Assets” rather than “Turnover”. We also drop all other controls except our measure
of residential real estate, which is also well reported as all firms must declare who its directors are
and provide an address. This leaves us with a sample of 2.5 million firm-year observations on 260
thousand unique firms and a point estimate of £0.009 on residential real estate. That this estimate
is still highly significant is encouraging. However, in doing this exercise we are adding to the sample
a large number of very small entities who may not have much ability, desire or need to grow (see
Pugsley and Hurst (2011)). This may explain the smaller coefficient.34 This can be seen if we com-
pare some summary statistics between the two samples. The median firm in our baseline sample has
£8 million in assets and median asset growth is around 3% per year. In contrast, in the expanded
sample the median firm has £110 thousand of assets and median asset growth is zero.
Table 6 presents additional specifications to address concerns regarding the identification of the
coefficient on residential real estate as discussed in Section 4.2.
Column (2) presents results when we use our instrumented house price series. Columns (3) and
(4) show what happens when we split firms into those operating in the tradable and non-tradable
34The change in coefficient is not explained by the change in scaling variable: the estimated coefficient in the baseline
regression for the impact of Residential Real Estate on investment is insensitive to the choice of lagged “Total Assets”
or “Turnover” as the scaling variable.
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sectors. Column (5) shows results when we only consider directors who live in a different region from
their firm. Columns (6) and (7) show results when we split firms by the average distance the director
lives from the firm (greater or less than 30 miles). Last, Column (8) presents results when we use a
smaller sample of multi-firm directors and proxy director skill using the performance of their other
firms. In every case the coefficients are similar to the baseline.
There are additional measurement challenges that arise regarding the impact of corporate real
estate. We discuss the specifics of how we address these and the related results in detail in Appendix
A. For the sake of brevity, in the main text we only reassure the reader that our estimates are robust
to these issues.
[Table 6 here]
5.3 Firm Financing
We now turn to how firms finance the increase in investment documented above. Recall that resi-
dential real estate can affect the available funding for the firm either through granting a claim on the
director’s house when guaranteeing a loan to the firm, or via the director extracting equity from their
house to inject funds directly into the firm. The latter can be in the form of insider debt financing
(director loans) or new equity. To explore the channels through which increases in the value of real
estate are converted into firm funding, we estimate the effects of residential and corporate real estate
on changes in specific parts of the liability side of the firm’s balance sheets. Specifically, we rerun
our specification with four liability measures as left hand side variables: (i) the change in “Issued
Capital”; (ii) the sum of the change in “Long Term Director Loans” and “Short Term Director Loans”
liabilities; (iii) the change in short term external debt liabilities;35 and (iv) the change in long term
external debt financing.36
The results are presented in Table 7. As for the effects of corporate real estate, the impact of
an increase in the value of the firm’s buildings only has a significant positive effect on measures of
35This is defined as the sum of the change in “Short Term Loans and Overdrafts” and “Trade Credit” less the change
in “Short Term Director Loans”. Short term loans are supposed to refer to maturities less than a year but there may
be some discrepancies across firms.
36This is defined as the change in “Long Term Debt” less the change in “Long Term Director Loans”.
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external debt financing: a £1 increase in corporate real estate increases long-term debt by about
£0.037. Short-term external debt increases by an additional £0.032 and the sum is of the same
magnitude as the £0.05 increase in investment. As would be expected, the change in the value of the
firm’s real estate does not lead to a change in issued equity. However, there is a negative coefficient
on director loans. This is only significant at the 10% level but the interpretation would be that part
of the external financing obtained from an increase in the value of a firm’s real estate is used to repay
loans from insiders.
[Table 7 here]
Residential real estate has a significant effect on both equity issuance and short-term debt, with
a more material impact on the latter: a £1 increase in the value of directors’ homes increases net
equity and short-term external debt by about £0.002 and £0.021, respectively. The point estimate
on long-term external borrowing suggests a £0.002 increase for every £1 increase in the value of the
average director’s house. This effect is not statistically significant; however, the size of the investment
response to residential real estate, on the asset side of the balance sheet, suggests that this mechanism
is present. Note also that it is common to use personal guarantees to support overdraft facilities in
the UK (see Riches and Allen (2009), page 80), which may explain why it is primarily short term
financing that responds. Summing across these four estimates, the firm increases its liabilities by an
additional £0.025 for every £1 increase in the value of residential real estate, which is similar to the
investment response (there is a small discrepancy but this is not statistically significant from zero).
The small size of the coefficient estimate on equity issuance, coupled with the lack of meaningful
response from director loans, suggests that direct cash injections from directors is the less important
marginal source of finance unlocked via residential real estate.37 The mechanism at work is, for
the most part, not one where directors remortgage their property to extract funds which they then
inject into their firms. Instead, the estimate related to increased short-term debt is consistent with
residential real estate operating through increasingly valuable personal guarantees from firm directors
that expand the corporate borrowing capacity of the firm.
37Our estimates are for existing firms. The sensitivity of the initial liability structure of new start-ups to the house
value of their directors may be quite different (see Robb and Robinson (2014); Schmalz et al. (2017)).
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5.4 Labour Market Implications
The increases in the value of real estate can also have implications for a firm’s use of labour inputs as
well as physical capital. Since an increase in residential real estate values primarily unlocks short-term
funding it may provide the working capital for the firm to hire new workers. To test this we alter our
left hand side variable and consider two separate labour inputs: (i) the change in the “Remuneration”
paid to employees; and (ii) the change in the “Number of Employees”. As per our other specifications,
we scale both variables by the lag of the firm’s “Turnover”. However, since “Number of Employees”
is a real variable we convert “Turnover” into real terms using the UK CPI when re-scaling.
[Table 8 here]
Table 8 reports the estimates for the effect of real estate on labour market outcomes. A £1 rise
in our residential real estate measure increases the firm’s total wage bill by around £0.033. The
equivalent figure for corporate real estate is £0.033. The employment estimate (0.0009) can be
interpreted as an increase of £1.1 million (in 2005 prices) in residential real estate values resulting
in the hiring of approximately one additional worker. The equivalent figure is one worker for every
£650 thousand increase in corporate real estate values.
Additional identification tests for the labour market regressions are provided in Tables 12 and 13
in Appendix A, with little impact on the results.
5.5 The Role of Heterogeneity
Having estimated the average effect of residential real estate on firm activity, we now turn to how
the channels vary through time and by firm characteristics. To explore whether the effects may be
asymmetric, we include in the baseline regression the interaction of both types of real estate with a
dummy variable indicating whether house price growth in the firm’s region is positive or negative.38
[Table 9 here]
Columns (1)-(2) in Table 9 show that the impact of residential real estate on investment is similar
when house prices are rising and falling. We also consider how our results vary if we allow differing
38Just over 25% of our firm-year observations occur when the regional house price is falling.
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effects in the pre- (2002-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2014) period. Inspecting Columns (3)-(4) one
sees that the effect of residential real estate is almost identical across the two subsamples. In contrast,
the effect of corporate real estate has weakened in the post crisis period and seems weaker in periods
characterised by falling house prices.
We now consider how the strength of both channels varies by various firm characteristics such
as age, a proxy for credit constraints, and size. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 10 show that the effect of
residential real estate is at least as important for older firms as for younger firms. This highlights
the contrast between our study and the entrepreneurship literature that has focused on the role of
housing wealth in financing start-ups (Corradin and Popov, 2015; Schmalz et al., 2017). We show
that our mechanism is just as relevant for mature firms.
Columns (3)-(4) consider how the financing position of firms shapes our baseline results. As
argued by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and emphasised by Chaney et al. (2012), it is unclear a priori
whether the sensitivity of investment to real estate values should increase with the extent of financing
constraints, so this remains ultimately an empirical question.39 Similarly to Chaney et al. (2012) we
use dividend payouts as a proxy for ex-ante financial constraints.40 The point estimates in Columns
(3)-(4) of Table 10 suggest that the effect of residential real estate on investment is larger for firms
that are “constrained” (those with low dividend payout ratios), though we cannot reject statistically
that the point estimates are the same.
[Table 10 here]
Finally, Columns (5)-(6) show how the sensitivity of investment to real estate values changes
across firm size. Our classification considers two groups: small and medium-sized firms (less than
250 employees using the UK classification), and large firms (greater than or equal to 250 employ-
ees). These correspond to the firms in the lower three quartiles and upper quartile of our sample
respectively. As one would expect, residential real estate has a statistically significant effect among
small and medium-sized firms. The coefficient is not statistically different from zero for large firms.
39See Hubbard (1998) for a survey of the literature on whether (Fazzari et al., 1988) or not (Kaplan and Zingales,
1997) estimated investment-cash flow sensitivities can be used as a proxy for financing constraints.
40We construct a payout ratio, defined as the ratio of “Dividends” to “Total Assets”, setting the ratio to 0 when
no dividends are reported. Firms with ‘high’ dividend payout ratios are those with a payout ratio above the 75th
percentile in a given year.
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However, the point estimates do suggest that large firms (£0.066) respond more than small firms
(£0.025). This counter intuitive finding is partly due to our regression design: the value of directors’
real estate does not scale with the size of the firm. The residential real estate variable enters the
regression scaled by the lag of “Turnover”, which means its value is mechanically falling with size.
This leads to two issues.
First, the amount of variation in the regressor then also falls with firm size. Specifically, the
standard deviation of Residential REi,t is 0.58 for small versus 0.22 for large firms. This diminishing
variation increases the coefficient estimate. If we, instead, re-express the coefficients in terms of
standard deviation moves, then a one standard deviation increase in residential real estate leads to
a 0.16 standard deviation increase in investment for small firms and a 0.14 increase for large firms.
Second, and related, the average ratio of investment to real estate values for small firms is higher
compared to large firms. If we convert our coefficient into an elasticity rather than a £ per £ estimate
small firms are more sensitive. To see this, note that we estimate a model equivalent to I=ηR, where
I is the £ value of investment and R is the £ value of residential real estate. The point estimate of η
is about 2.7 times larger for large firms than for small and medium-sized firms (0.066/0.025). We can
convert our estimate into an elasticity by using the expression ∆I
I
=ηR
I
∆R
R
. The median residential
real estate to investment ratio (R/I) is about 9 times larger for SMEs than for the large firms. Thus,
the estimated elasticity is about three and a half times larger for small firms than for large firms: a
1% increase in the value of directors’ homes leads to a 0.16% increase in investment by small firms
and a 0.05% increase in investment for large firms.
As a final sense check of our results, we examine whether residential real estate affects the be-
haviour of the very largest of firms in our sample, where the value directors’ homes should be small
compared to the size of the balance sheet. Specifically, in Column (7) of Table 9, we limit our regres-
sion sample to the 90 firms in our baseline sample who employ more than 10,000 people on average.41
As one would expect, for such firms, residential real estate does not have a statistically significant
impact on firm behaviour, furthermore the sign is counter intuitive.
41As a more direct test we have also looked at restricted sample of firms for whom the total value of directors’
homes is less than 1% of “Total Assets”. This coefficient on Residential RE in this sample is also negative and not
statistically significant.
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6 Macroeconomic Consequences
In this section we illustrate the macroeconomic implications of our firm level estimates on the impact
of directors’ residential real estate values, and how they compare to the effects of corporate real estate
values.
6.1 Back of The Envelope Calculation
Our first pass is to perform a simple back of the envelope calculation combining our firm level
estimates with aggregate numbers for total firm investment and wages, and director and corporate
real estate holdings. We estimate that in 2014, at the end of our sample period, the total value of
residential property held by all current firm directors in the UK, including those at firms outside our
baseline sample, is £1.5 trillion,42 with the total value of commercial property held by all owner-
occupying firms around 4 times smaller at £350 billion (IPF (2016)). For comparison, 2014 GDP
was £1.8 trillion, so in aggregate the real estate owned by firm directors is around 80% of GDP, with
the aggregate commercial property held by owner-occupying firms around 20% of GDP.
Our baseline regression estimates are that a £1 increase in the value of directors’ residential real
estate increases a firm’s investment by £0.030 and total wage bill by £0.033. Similarly, a £1 increase
in the value of corporate real estate increases a firm’s investment by £0.051 and total wage bill by
£0.033. Aggregate UK investment by private non-financial corporations in 2014 was £157 billion
with another £567 billion spent on remunerating employees. Combining these numbers implies that
a 1% increase in real estate prices increases investment by 0.28% and total wages paid by 0.08%
through the effects of residential real estate, and 0.11% and 0.02% respectively through the effects
of corporate collateral real estate.
As we confirmed in Section 5.5, residential real estate only has a statistically significant impact
on the investment of SMEs (firms with less than 250 employees). In the UK, only 42% of investment
42To compute this in each year t we calculated Vt = nD,t×pH,t×ot, where Vt is the total value of residential property
held by firm directors in year t, nD,t is the number of distinct individuals with at least one current directorship at a
live firm in year t, pH,t is average house price of these directors in year t, and ot is the proportion of directors that own
the property they live at. For 2014 there are 2.8 million directors and the average value of their properties is £570
thousand. Furthermore, from Section 3, the home ownership rate for directors is estimated at 90% which we plug in
for ot. The estimate of Vt ranges from around £1 Trillion in 2005 to £1.5 Trillion in 2014.
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is conducted by SMEs.43 One might be concerned, therefore, that the simple calculations above
represent a stark overestimate of the aggregate effects. This is not the case. To see this, first note
that 99% of the residential real estate by value held by firm directors is held by directors of SMEs.
Only 0.4% of firms in the UK are large firms with at least 250 employees.44 While large firms have
on average two more directors and their directors have homes worth more than twice as much, the
weight of numbers means almost all the residential real estate owned by directors is owned by the
directors of SMEs.45 Specifically, we estimate that directors of large firms have real estate worth
£18 billion compared to the £1.5 trillion total. Now consider the estimates above for aggregate
investment using our estimates based on size. A 1% increase in real estate prices increases the value
of the real estate of directors of SMEs by £14.5 billion and, in Table 10, we estimate for every £1
increase their firms invest £0.025. This will increase investment by £360 million or about 0.23%
of aggregate investment. In contrast, the same increase in prices raises the value of the homes of
directors of large firms by £180 million. The point estimate in Table 10 is not significantly different
from zero, however, taking it at face value the estimate of £0.066 implies an increase in investment
of £12 million (or less than 0.01% of investment).
In contrast, the effects of an increase in real estate prices running through corporate real estate
holdings is mainly through large firms. To estimate this, we use the fact that the mean ratio of
corporate real estate holdings to “Turnover” is almost identical for SMEs and large firms in our
sample. In aggregate, turnover is split 46% to SMEs and 54% to large firms,46 suggesting that
corporate real estate holdings are split 54-46 between large firms and SMEs. Plugging in the necessary
figures based on our size regression, we obtain an estimate that a 1% increase in real estate prices
raises investment by 0.07% via the behaviour of large firms and 0.04% via the behaviour of SMEs.
We may still be overestimating the aggregate effects of residential real estate if our sample is
not representative of the behaviour of SMEs in general. If we instead assume that a £1 increase
in residential real estate values leads an SME to invest £0.009 more - consistent with our large
43From the UK Annual Business Survey, for 2014.
44From the UK Annual Business Survey, for 2014.
45We use our data to obtain the average house value for all (matched) directors, £570 thousand. For the directors
of firms with at least 250 employees the average house value is £1.3 million. The average large firm has 5.8 directors
versus 4.1 directors for the SMEs in our sample.
46From the UK Annual Business Survey, for 2014.
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sample regression in Column (6) in Table 5 - then a 1% increase in real estate prices would increase
investment by 0.08%. Even then, the effect of an increase in real estate prices on investment running
though residential real estate would be of similar magnitude to that running through corporate real
estate.
Of course, all of our calculations so far are based on static, microeconometric estimates. Such
calculations omit general equilibrium feedback effects and thus may underestimate the implications
for economic aggregates. To address this we now turn to an estimated DSGE model.
6.2 Results From A General Equilibrium Model
To explore potential feedback effects in the macroeconomy, this section extends the general equilib-
rium model of Liu et al. (2013) and Liu et al. (2016) by incorporating both forms of real estate as
sources of finance in a model with financially constrained firms.
The model features two types of agents in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): a patient
household who is the supplier of funds and an impatient entrepreneur whose borrowing capacity
is constrained by the market value of physical assets it owns. The entrepreneur produces output
using physical capital, commercial land and a labour input supplied by the household. An additional
key feature of our model is the introduction of an additional asset to the entrepreneurial sector:
residential land. The entrepreneur derives utility flow from holding residential land which can also
be used as collateral to fund firm borrowing. Note that here we explicitly assume that the source of
our regression results is financial constraints.
The full description of the model and details about the estimation and calibration are presented
in Online Appendix E. The model is log-linearised and estimated using Bayesian methods to fit six
UK time series over 1975Q3-2015Q1: real house prices, the inverse of the relative price of investment,
real per capita consumption, real per capita investment, real per capita lending to non-financial
corporations and per capita hours worked.
Financial Constraint A key feature of the model is the assumption that the entrepreneur’s opti-
misation problem is subject to an endogenous collateral constraint. This takes the following form:
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Bt ≤ θtEt [ql,t+1 (ω1Lc,t + ω2Lr,t) + ω3qk,t+1Kt] , (6.1)
where Bt is the real value of debt issued by the entrepreneur, θt is a shock to the collateral con-
straint, ql,t is the market price of land, Lc,t is commercial land, Lr,t is residential land owned by the
entrepreneur, qk,t is the relative price of investment in consumption units and Kt is physical capital.
The parameters ω1, ω2 and ω3 measure the pledgeability of commercial land, residential land and
physical capital. Following Liu et al. (2016), we normalise ω1 = 1, and estimate ω3 as part of the
Bayesian estimation. To calibrate the value of ω2, we use our microeconomic estimates of the relative
sensitivity of debt to commercial and residential real estate values (Table 7). This yields the value
ω2 = 0.33.47
The Impact of Housing Demand Shocks Households in the model are also owners of land and
they derive utility from their land holdings. The utility flow is subject to stochastic disturbances
referred to as housing demand shocks. This shock features prominently in Liu et al. (2013) and
Liu et al. (2016), and can explain a large fraction of US business cycle fluctuations via the follow-
ing mechanism: (i) a housing demand shock that raises the household’s marginal utility of land
increases household demand for land and therefore land prices; (ii) higher land prices increases the
entrepreneur’s net worth, triggering competing demand for land between the two sectors that drives
up the land price further; (iii) increased net worth expands the entrepreneur’s capacity to borrow
more to finance investment and production; (iv) the expansion adds to household wealth and raises
land prices further, thereby generating further ripple effects. The collateral channel amplifies and
propagates the housing shock, leading to dynamic expansions of investment, hours, and output.
We build on this mechanism by allowing the entrepreneur to own residential land and pledge it to
finance the firm (this is our main departure from Liu et al. (2013)). To quantify the relative impor-
tance of this, we solve and simulate the model under different values of ω2 in the credit constraint.
Our main goal is to see how changing the value of ω2 (and thereby changing the pledgeability of res-
idential real estate owned by the entrepreneur) changes the dynamic propagation of housing shocks
47Calculated as 0.0210+0.00230.0318+0.0373 .
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to the macroeconomy. This exercise can be interpreted as a way of assessing the macroeconomic
importance of our channel.48
For this exercise, we use a combination of calibrated and estimated parameters to fit the model
to UK data. As described above, we use our micro estimates to calibrate the relative pledgeability
of corporate and residential real estate. A second important aspect of our calibration, which is also
informed by our micro-data, is the assumption that 25% of total residential land is owned by the
entrepreneur in steady state.49 This introduces a non-trivial source of residential collateral for the
production sector.
[Figure 2 here]
To explore how important borrowing against residential real estate is for macroeconomic fluctu-
ations, we first analyse the effects of the housing demand shock with and without our mechanism of
interest. To perform this exercise, Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions for the baseline
(ω2 = 0.33) and for the model when residential real estate is not pledgeable (ω2 = 0). In the baseline,
depicted by the black circled lines, a shock which increases house prices by 1% on impact has a
0.2-0.3% peak effect on output and employment, and it has a 1.2% peak impact on investment. In
the counterfactual economy, the impact of the housing shock drops substantially. In fact, the black
circled lines in Figure 2 show that a housing shock of the same magnitude has about a 30% smaller
effect on all macroeconomic variables relative to the baseline.
Interpreting the UK Business Cycle
[Figure 3 here]
To shed light on the historical importance of our mechanism over the past four decades of UK
business cycles, we use the estimated model to compute the counterfactual path of investment that
48Note that while changing ω2, we keep the steady-state level of corporate debt fixed. This means that when we set
ω2 = 0, then the credit constraint 6.1 becomes Bt ≤ θtEt [ql,t+1 (ω1Lc,t + Φ) + ω3qk,t+1Kt], where the level of Φ is set
to equal the steady-state of ω2L¯r in the baseline model. In essence, some fraction of the endogenous credit constraint
become exogenous in order to ensure that the steady-state level of B is unchanged across models.
49This is the ratio of our estimate of the total value of residential real estate held by firm directors to the total
housing stock in the UK.
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would have been realised if the residential real estate had not been pledgeable. To perform this coun-
terfactual exercise we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the model and store the estimated
series of structural shocks. Second, we change ω2 from the baseline value of 0.33 to 0, thereby shut-
ting down the channel, and then compute policy functions for this new model. Third, we combine
the estimated structural shocks from step 1 with the new policy functions in step 2 to compute the
counterfactual path of the variable of interest. By doing so, we ask: how would the propagation of all
structural shocks (including that of the housing shock) to investment have changed if the collateral
value of residential real estate held by entrepreneurs had been zero? Figure 3 shows the counter-
factual (circled blue line) path of investment along with the actual (black line) path in the data.
The result suggests that borrowing against residential real estate played a major role in the fall of
investment in the early 1990s as well as during the Great Recession. Conversely, it had a sizeable
positive contribution to the economic expansion during the housing boom of the late 1980s and early
2000s.
7 Conclusion
The global housing boom of the 2000’s and the Great Recession that followed, demonstrated striking
correlations between real estate prices and economic activity. To explain these phenomena, the
literature has mainly focused on quantifying mechanisms operating through household balance sheets
and consumer demand as well as on mechanisms operating through corporate balance sheets and firm
activity. Our paper attempts to quantify an additional channel which links household balance sheets
with firm activity via the residential real estate of firm directors. We have shown that a £1 increase
in the total value of directors’ residential real estate leads the directors’ firm to increase investment
and wages by around £0.03. We have also corroborated previous studies and found that a £1 increase
in the value of a firm’s corporate real estate leads the firm to increase investment by around £0.05
and to spend £0.03 more on wages. We showed that a simple general equilibrium model with credit
constraints can embed both forms of real estate, and we argued that residential real estate can play
an important role in propagating house price shocks to the wider economy through its direct impact
on corporate behaviour.
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In terms of the policy implications of the analysis, the link between asset prices and activity has
led to calls for macroprudential policy targeted at the housing market to limit the extent of property
price cycles. This would, it is argued, reduce the severity of recessions. However, the mechanisms
linking real estate prices and the economy must be determined to evaluate the effectiveness of such
policies. This paper highlights one such channel, quantifying the causal impact of a change in real
estate prices on firm activity, acting through the residential real estate of firm directors. This is
important as it implies that residential real estate has implications for aggregate supply as well as
aggregate demand. This alters the trade-offs associated with using macroprudential tools to target
the housing market and complicates the interaction with monetary policy.
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A Additional Regressions
A.1 Measurement of Corporate Real Estate
Table 11 presents additional results to address concerns regarding the measurement of corporate real
estate holdings.
[Table 11 here]
A potential criticism of our estimated results for the corporate real estate measure is the use of
residential house prices to proxy changes in the market value of commercial real estate. We therefore
re-estimate the baseline regression using commercial real estate prices to compute our measure.
The data on CRE prices comes from the Investment Property Databank. However, as this is only
available for a range of major UK cities (as opposed to local authority level), we lose around 50% of
the observations compared to the baseline estimates in Table 4. The results, presented in Column
(2) of Table 11, show similar coefficient estimates for both corporate and residential real estate,
suggesting that the use of residential real estate prices is not a bad proxy.
We also assume that the appropriate price index with which to value a firm’s real estate is the
index for the region where its registered office (using the BvD field “R/O Full Postcode”) is located.
This may be problematic if the firm has buildings in multiple different regions. We do, however,
see in our dataset the addresses of all locations where the firm has operations (BvD field “Trading
Addresses”). Columns (3) and (4) in Table 11 present results which interact our real estate measures
with a dummy indicating if firms operate in one unique region or have operations outside the region
of their registered office, with similar results for both groups.
The book value of “Land and Buildings” in 2002 may be a poor proxy for their market value.
To address this, we impute market values from the book values by adopting the recursion method
used in Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) and Gan (2007) amongst others, which
treats the valuation of land in a “last in, first out” (LIFO) fashion. The recursion can be written as
follows:
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LYi,t =

LYi,t−1
LPj,t
LPj,t−1
+ dBi,t if dLBi,t ≥ 0
LYi,t−1
LPj,t
LPj,t−1
+ dBi,t
LPj,t
LAi,t−1
if dLBi,t < 0
LAi,t =

LPj,t if dL
B
i,t ≥ 0
LAi,t−1 if dL
B
i,t < 0,
(A.1)
where LYi,t is the market value of land owned by firm i at time t in region j, LPj,t is the market
price of land in region j at time t, LAi,t is the price at which land was last bought by firm i, and
dLBi,t = LBi,t − LBi,t−1 is the change in the book value of land, LBi,t, owned by firm i.
To implement this method one needs to make an assumption regarding the market value of land
in the base year, LYi,0. We take as the base year the first recorded value of “Land and Buildings”
within three years of incorporation, at which time we assume that the market value and book value of
“Land and Buildings” are the same. Additionally, whenever the book value of “Land and Buildings”
is zero, we infer that the market value is also zero.
Given a time series for LYi,t, we then recompute our corporate real estate measure by fixing land
holdings at the market value in 2002, LYi,2002, and iterating forward using the regional price index.
Column (5) of Table 11 shows a larger point estimate for corporate real estate when doing this, with
a very similar estimate for residential real estate.
We also test the extent to which our choice to fix the initial stock of “Land and Buildings” in
2002, as opposed to letting it vary after this date, may influence our results. To do this we redefine
our measure as:
CorporateREi,t = LBi,t−1
LPj,t
LPj,t−1
,
where LBi,t−1 is the previous year’s book value of “Land and Buildings” reported by the firm. This
means that investment decisions in previous years now affect our real estate measure (although,
for obvious reasons, we do not include investment in the current period). Column (6) of Table 11
presents the regression estimates when corporate real estate values are redefined in this fashion. The
coefficient on corporate real estate is now negative and remains highly significant. An explanation
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for this result is that investment in “Land and Buildings” may have a negative serial correlation:
if a firm bought a building in the previous period it is unlikely to invest in a new building in the
current period, which would bias down the coefficient estimate. Indeed, as shown in Column (7), if
one looks at investment excluding “Land and Buildings” the coefficient on corporate real estate is
positive once more and has a similar value to the baseline regression in Column (1). This finding
illustrates our reasoning behind the use of our baseline corporate real estate measure. Importantly for
the robustness of our main result; the coefficient on residential real estate remains highly significant
and of similar magnitude when using this alternative definition of corporate real estate.
A.2 Identification for Labour Market Variables
Tables 12 and 13 repeat the identification regressions of Table 6 with the dependent variable replaced
by the change in remuneration and change in employment respectively.
[Table 12 here]
[Table 13 here]
A.3 First Stage Regression for Real Estate Price Instrument
Recall that we generate an instrumental series for real estate prices in 150 regions in England using
the specification in Equation 4.2. We estimate this equation over the period January 1995 until
January 2016. Table 14 presents the results of the regression.
[Table 14 here]
To give context to the coefficient estimate, note that the mean share of constraintsk is 37%,
which implies for the average region a 1 percentage point increase in mortgage rates translates into
an additional 3.5% fall in house prices compared to a region where no land was developed in 1990.
Alternatively, a one standard deviation tightening in our measure of supply constraints (27% shift
in the developed land share) causes an additional 2.5% fall in house price for every 1 percentage
point increase in the interest rate. This effect is highly significant and the marginal F-stat for
constraintsk × rt is 36.
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B Sources of Variation
Recall that our measure of residential real estate as defined in Equation 3.2 had three different sources
of variation: (i) the initial value of director homes differs (Ldi,2002); (ii) directors can live in different
regions from their firm (and so LPhd,t 6= LPj,t); and (iii) firms may have different numbers of directors
(Ni). To assess the importance of these three sources of variation we define three alternative series
with each source of variation turned off one by one:
1. Directors all live in the same valued house. We modify Equation 3.2, to
Residential RE samehousei,t =
Ni
(N˜i)
N˜i∑
d=1
L¯2002L
P
hd,t
,
where L¯2002 is the mean value of a directors house in 2002.
2. Directors all live in the same region as their firm. We modify Equation 3.2, to
Residential RE sameregioni,t =
Ni
(N˜i)
N˜i∑
d=1
Ldi,2002L
P
j,t,
where LPj,t is the firm’s regional house price index.
3. Firms have the same number of directors. We modify Equation 3.2, to
Residential RE samedirectorsi,t =
N¯
(N˜i)
N˜i∑
d=1
Ldi,2002L
P
hd,t
,
where N¯ is the mean number of directors per firm in 2002.
Columns (2)-(4) in Table 15 present results when we replace Residential REi,t in Equation 4.1 with
each of these three measures in turn. As can be seen, the coefficient on our residential real estate
measure goes to zero when all directors are assumed to live in a house of the same value, whereas
assuming all directors live in the same region as their firm has almost no impact on the coefficient.
Assuming all firms have the same number of directors lowers the coefficient a little but we cannot
reject that the coefficient is the same as the baseline.
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It is true then, that variation in Ldi,2002 is key to our results. However, it is not sufficient alone to
generate our results. To see this, we define a new measure
Residential RE sameregion&directorsi,t =
N¯
(N˜i)
N˜i∑
d=1
Ldi,2002L
P
j,t,
so that for firms within the same region the only source of variation in Residential Real Estate is the
average initial house price of their directors. In Column (5) in Table 15 we see that the coefficient
estimate on this variable is around half of the baseline results, with this estimate only marginally
significant at the 10% level. Hence, to obtain our estimates we need variation in Ldi,2002 plus one of
the other two sources of variation.
[Table 15 here]
43
C Home Values and Corporate Borrowing: Cross-country
Comparison
As mentioned in the main text, a recent Bank of England survey of major lenders shows that about
29% of lending to SMEs and mid-size corporations was secured with a personal guarantee (PG
henceforth). Table 16 summarises previous research confirming that similar numbers were obtained
for Ireland and Finland, whereas the prevalence of PGs seems higher in Australia, US and Japan.
Here, we provide a brief summary of the results.
Carroll et al. (2015) uses data from the Irish Department of Finance SME Credit Demand Survey
and finds that the probability of PG usage is decreasing in a firm’s number of employees, turnover,
age, and profitability. They also provide strong evidence on the complementarity between PGs and
real estate collateral: “For loans without any specific collateral item attached, personal guarantee
usage is 29% whereas for firms that post a specific security such as land, property, machinery or other
assets, personal guarantee usage is 59%” (pp. 2).
Ono and Uesugi (2009) employs data from the Survey of the Financial Environment conducted
by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan in October 2002. They document that the use
ratios of collateral and PGs are 71.7% and 66.7%, respectively. However, these numbers may likely
be biased upwards, as firms in their sample have multiple loan contracts with a main bank.
[Table 16 here]
Calcagnini et al. (2014) uses information on loans from a large sample of Italian non-financial
firms and document that about 40% of the total number of loans were secured with a PG. Peltoniemi
and Vieru (2013) uses a confidential contract-level corporate loan database for Finland to document
that PGs are used in about 30% of loans. Davydenko and Franks (2008) studies incidents of corporate
bankruptcies, and finds that French banks are very likely to activate the entrepreneur’s PG, with
about 35% of total collateral comprising of PGs at default. In Spain, CEET (2010) shows that about
80% of SMEs are required to offer some form of collateral when applying for a bank loan, and about
35% of collateral is made up of PGs.
44
In the US, Bathala et al. (2006) conducted a survey among 201 privately-owned SMEs and found
that about 53% of these firms used PGs from major stockholders, officers or directors as a form of
covenant for bank loans. Using the larger National Survey for Small Business Finances (conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board), Meisenzahl (2014) reports that in the 1998 and 2003 waves, about
54% of firms receiving bank credit gave PGs.
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Tables
Table 1: Survey Evidence On The Type Of Security Used When Obtaining A Business Loan In The
UK
Secured on Any Property Secured By Guarantee or Res. Property
(1) (2)
0-1 Employees 80% 46%
2-49 Employees 81% 40%
50-249 Employees 67% 27%
250+ Employees – –
All Firms 79% 42%
(a) Results from Surveys of Borrowers
Secured on Any Property Secured By Guarantee
(1) (2)
0-1 Employees 86% 12%
2-49 Employees 80% 33%
50-249 Employees 54% 31%
250+ Employees 50% 25%
All Firms 73% 29%
(b) Results From Surveys Of Lenders
Notes for Panel A: the values are calculated based on the answers to the question ‘What security was used to get this (business)
loan?’ in the UK Survey of SME Finances (2004 and 2008 waves). Only firms that have a commercial loan outstanding (46%)
answer this question. In the survey there 13 responses for the types of security: (a) the firm’s stock or trade debtors; (b) equipment
or vehicles; (c) business owned securities; (d) business property; (e) personal property (e.g. house); (f) mixed property (e.g. flat
above shop); (g) other personal assets; (h) floating charge; (i) directors or personal guarantee; (j) other reserves; (k) life insurance
policy; (l) other; (m) do not know. Column (1) shows the share of firms that answer (d)-(f) and hence secure their loan against
property of any type. Column (2) shows the share of firms that report using non-business property (e)-(f) or a personal guarantee
(i) to secure a loan. Both columns report the share of firms that respond they did use the particular form of security when borrow-
ing, broken down by firm size. Responses are weighted using the sampling weights provided by the surveys. We exclude firms that
operate in the real estate and construction sector (note that no firms operating in the financial or mining sectors are included in the survey).
Notes for Panel B: The panel presents the results of the Bank of England’s 2015 survey of UK SME and Mid-Corporate Lending. This
survey covered loans from the five major UK banks to businesses borrowing at least £250k, and whose annual revenue was no more than
£500million. Our values are calculated from responses to the question: ‘Does your bank hold any of the following as collateral?’. The
bank can give 5 potential answers: (a) property; (b) debenture including charges over plant, equipment and vehicles; (c) cash or cash
equivalent; (d) other tangible collateral/security; (e) personal guarantee. Column (1) shows the fraction of business loans (weighted by
number) where the response was (a), secured on property, broken down by the size of business being lent to. Column (2) shows the fraction
of business loans (weighted by number) that were secured by a personal guarantee, response (e), also broken down by the size of business
being lent to. We exclude lending to firms in mining and quarrying, construction, financial and insurance activities, and commercial real
estate sectors. We reweight the sample to correct for some oversampling of certain loan types by the Bank of England that was done for
regulatory purposes.
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Table 2: Firm Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median 25%tile 75%tile sd N
Levels
Turnover (£ 000s) 142,318 11,922 5,534 31,379 1.255e+06 32,244
Total Assets (£ 000s) 150,419 8,040 3,711 21,144 1.377e+06 32,244
No. Employees 1,182 107 50 258 11,343 32,244
Residential Real Estate (£ 000s) 3,535 2,143 1,228 3,934 4,830 32,244
Corporate Real Estate (£ 000s) 29,221 1,118 73.09 4,201 351,374 32,244
No. Directors (2002) 4.196 4 3 5 1.890 32,244
Ratios (to Lagged Turnover)
Investment 0.0403 0.0169 0.00263 0.0573 0.0922 32,244
Residential Real Estate 0.389 0.166 0.0637 0.427 0.535 32,244
Residential Equity 0.162 0.0701 0.0257 0.183 0.224 14,909
Corporate Real Estate 0.215 0.0754 0.00613 0.225 0.335 32,244
Cash 0.0102 0.00126 -0.0449 0.0534 0.134 32,244
Profit 0.0306 0.0286 0.00519 0.0664 0.0912 32,244
Change in Remuneration 0.0132 0.00754 -0.00690 0.0298 0.0566 32,244
Change in Employment 0.000251 4.51e-05 -0.000441 0.000740 0.00235 32,244
Change in Issued Equity 0.000985 0 0 0 0.00576 32,244
Change in Director Loans -1.24e-05 0 0 0 0.0100 32,244
Change in ST Debt 0.0121 0.00549 -0.0215 0.0385 0.0857 32,244
Change in LT Debt 0.00667 -0.00278 -0.0168 0.00757 0.0921 32,244
Notes: The statistics are calculated using the sample of observations for the baseline regression, covering the period 2002-2014. This
excludes firms who have an ownership stake greater than 50%, operate in certain industries, and report the main variables of interest for
our regressions. Full details on sample selection are given in Section 3.1.1. Residential Real Estate is defined by Equation 3.2, and
Corporate Real Estate is defined by Equation 3.1. Investment is defined as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”. Cash is
defined as “Bank Deposits” less “Bank Overdrafts”. Profit is defined as “Operating Profit”. Change in Remuneration is defined as the
change in “Remuneration”. Change in Employment is defined as the change in “Number of Employees”. Change in Issued Equity is
defined as the change in “Issued Capital”. Change in Director Loans is defined as the sum of the change in “Long Term Director Loans”
and “Short Term Director Loans” liabilities. Change in Short Term Debt is defined as the sum of the change in “Short Term Loans and
Overdrafts” and “Trade Credit” less the change in “Short Term Director Loans”. Change in Long Term Debt is defined as the change in
“Long Term Debt” less the change in “Long Term Director Loans”. All ratios are winsorized. The changes in firm liabilities and
employment are winsorized at the 2/98% level. All other ratios are winsorized at the median plus minus five times the interquartile range.
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Table 3: Director Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median 25%tile 75%tile sd N
Director House Value (£000s) 1,043 615.9 347.8 1,150 1,660 95,523
Director Outside Firm Region 0.657 1 0 1 0.475 78,029
Director Distance From Firm (Miles) 32.95 11.01 4.366 31.11 56.97 77,714
Director Age (Years) 52.79 52.29 44.79 60.10 11.03 145,885
Male Directors 0.847 1 1 1 0.360 144,341
Non-UK Directors 0.0556 0 0 0 0.229 145,532
Experience (Years) 35.39 18.25 8.750 39.58 59.16 145,911
No. Industries Worked In 3.644 3 1 5 3.167 145,911
Firms With At Birth 2.006 1 0 2 7.925 145,911
Firms That Have Failed 3.231 1 0 3 10.32 145,911
Notes: The statistics are calculated for all the directors in the sample of observations used for the baseline regressions (2002-2014). This
excludes firms who have an ownership stake greater than 50%, operate in certain industries, and report the main variables of interest for
our regressions. Full details on sample selection are given in Section 3.1.1. Director House Value is the value of individual director houses
as described in Online Appendix C. Director Outside Firm Region is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a director’s matched
address is in a different region to their firm’s location. Director Distance From Firm is the distance between a director’s house and their
firm’s location, as defined in Section 3.3. Full definitions of remaining director variables are given in Online Appendix B.
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Table 4: Firm Investment And The Real Estate Channels
Investment
Residential Fixed Controls, Just Just
RE Effects, No Fixed Residential Corporate
Alone No Controls Effects Baseline RE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Residential RE 0.0478*** 0.0300*** 0.0232** 0.0298*** 0.0375***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Corporate RE 0.0494*** 0.0691*** 0.0511*** 0.0600***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Cash 0.0768*** 0.0777*** 0.0778*** 0.0778***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Profits 0.1250*** 0.1092*** 0.1079*** 0.1069***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 32509 32244 32509 32244 32244 32244
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-time FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: This Table reports the link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and firm investment. The sample covers reporting
UK firms over the period 2002-2014. The dependent variable, Investment, is defined as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”.
Residential RE is the total value of residential property held by directors of the firm, holding the composition of directors and their
properties fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with changes in their respective regional house price indices, as defined in
Equation 3.2. Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm “Land and Buildings” iterated forward using the regional house price index,
as defined in Equation 3.1. Cash and Profits enter with a lag. All of these variables are scaled by the lag of firm "Turnover". Add. Firm.
Dir. Controls comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the house price index in the firm region;
the firm’s regional house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios are winsorized at the median ± 5
times the interquartile range. Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. Column (1): the effect of residential real estate
excluding all further controls with the exception of firm fixed effects. Column (2): both real estate channels, region-time, industry-time
and firm fixed effects. Column (3) includes the firm controls and only firm fixed effects. Column (4) is the baseline regression including all
controls and fixed effects. Column (5) presents the baseline regression omitting Corporate RE. Column (6) presents the baseline regression
omitting Residential RE.
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Table 7: Firm Financing And Real Estate Channels
Financing
Issued Equity Director Loans ST Debt LT Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residential RE 0.0015** -0.0001 0.0210** 0.0023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012)
Corporate RE -0.0007 -0.0027* 0.0318* 0.0373**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 32244 32244 32244 32244
Adjusted R2 0.29 -0.02 -0.00 0.04
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: This Table reports the empirical link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and firm financing. The sample covers
reporting UK firms over the period 2002-2014. Issued Equity is the change in “Issued Capital” whilst Director Loans is the sum of the
change in “Long Term Director Loans” and “Short Term Director Loans” liabilities. Short Term Debt is defined as the sum of the change
in “Short Term Loans and Overdrafts” and “Trade Credit” less the change in “Short Term Director Loans”. Long Term Debt is defined as
the change in “Long Term Debt” less the change in “Long Term Director Loans”. Residential RE is the total value of residential property
held by directors of the firm, holding the composition of directors and their properties fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with
changes in their respective regional house price indices, as defined in Equation 3.2. Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm "Land
and Buildings" iterated forward using the regional house price index, as defined in Equation 3.1. All of these variables are scaled by the
lag of firm “Turnover”. Add. Firm. Dir. Controls comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the
house price index in the firm region; the firm’s regional house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios
are winsorized at the median ± 5 times the interquartile range, except for the financing variables which are winsorized at the 2/98% level.
Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. All regressions include firm, region-time and (2 digit) industry-time fixed effects.
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Table 8: Firm Employment And Wages
Labour Market Variables
Change in Remuneration Change in Employment
(1) (2)
Residential RE 0.0332*** 0.0009***
(0.006) (0.000)
Corporate RE 0.0332*** 0.0015***
(0.010) (0.000)
Cash 0.0043 0.0003
(0.006) (0.000)
Profit 0.1455*** 0.0037***
(0.012) (0.000)
Observations 32244 32244
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.18
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls Yes Yes
Region-time FE Yes Yes
Industry-time FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: This Table reports the link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and two employment variables. The sample covers
reporting UK firms over the period 2002-2014. Change in Remuneration is the change “Remuneration”, whilst Change in Employment is
the change in “Number of Employees”. Residential RE is the total value of residential property held by directors of the firm, holding the
composition of directors and their properties fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with changes in their respective regional house
price indices, as defined in Equation 3.2. Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm "Land and Buildings" iterated forward using the
regional house price index, as defined in Equation 3.1. Cash and Profits enter with a lag. All of these variables are scaled by the lag of
firm "Turnover". Add. Firm. Dir. Controls comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the house
price index in the firm region; the firm’s regional house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios are
winsorized at the median ± 5 times the interquartile range, except for Change in Employment which is winsorized at the 2/98% level.
Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. All regressions include firm, region-time and (2 digit) industry-time fixed effects.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous Responses: Asymmetries Over Time
Investment
House Prices Time Period
Rising Falling Pre-2007 Post-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residential RE 0.0291*** 0.0364*** 0.0321*** 0.0314***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Corporate RE 0.0547*** 0.0301* 0.0650*** 0.0408**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Cash 0.0787*** 0.0791***
(0.012) (0.012)
Profit 0.1090*** 0.1101***
(0.016) (0.016)
P-Value, Equality of Residential Coeffs. 0.0459 0.8692
Observations 32244 32244
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls Yes Yes
Region-time FE Yes Yes
Industry-time FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: This Table reports the link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and firm investment. The sample covers reporting
UK firms over the period 2002-2014. The dependent variable, Investment, is defined as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”.
Residential RE is the total value of residential property held by directors of the firm, holding the composition of directors and their properties
fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with changes in their respective regional house price indices, as defined in Equation 3.2.
Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm "Land and Buildings" iterated forward using the regional house price index, as defined in
Equation 3.1. Cash and Profits enter with a lag. All of these variables are scaled by the lag of firm "Turnover". Add. Firm. Dir. Controls
comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the house price index in the firm region; the firm’s regional
house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios are winsorized at the median ± 5 times the interquartile
range. Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. All regressions include firm, region-time and (2 digit) industry-time fixed
effects. Columns (1)-(2) include the interaction of both Residential and Corporate RE with a dummy variable indicating whether annual
house price growth in the firm region is positive or negative. Columns (3)-(4) include the interaction of both Residential and Corporate
RE with a dummy variable indicating whether the observations fall within the 2002-2006 or the 2007-2014 period.
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Table 14: First Stage Regression For Real Estate Price Instrument
Real Estate Prices
Baseline
(1)
constraintsk × rt -9.500***
(1.583)
Observations 37800
Adjusted R2 0.95
Time FE Yes
Region FE Yes
Standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: The table reports the results for the estimation of Equation 4.2 over the sample period Jan-1995 to Mar-2016 for 150 English regions.
The dependent variable, real estate prices, is defined in log levels. The explanatory variable is the regional share of developable land that
was developed in 1990 (constraintsk) interacted with as the 2-year 75%-LTV UK mortgage rate (rt). Region and time fixed effects both
included.
65
Table 15: Residential Real Estate: Sources Of Variation
Investment
Same
Same Same Same Region &
Baseline House Region Directors Directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Residential RE 0.0298*** -0.0001 0.0308*** 0.0277*** 0.0161*
(0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Corporate RE 0.0511*** 0.0600*** 0.0503*** 0.0526*** 0.0555***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Cash 0.0777*** 0.0778*** 0.0777*** 0.0776*** 0.0778***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Profit 0.1092*** 0.1069*** 0.1096*** 0.1084*** 0.1084***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 32244 32244 32244 32244 32244
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: The table reports the link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and firm investment. The sample covers reporting
UK firms over the period 2002-2014. The dependent variable, Investment, is defined as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”.
Residential RE is the total value of residential property held by directors of the firm, holding the composition of directors and their
properties fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with changes in their respective regional house price indices, as defined in
Equation 3.2. Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm “Land and Buildings” iterated forward using the regional house price index,
as defined in Equation 3.1. Cash and Profits enter with a lag. All of these variables are scaled by the lag of firm “Turnover”. Add. Firm.
Dir. Controls comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the house price index in the firm region;
the firm’s regional house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios are winsorized at the median ± 5
times the interquartile range. Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. Column (1) is the baseline regression including all
controls and fixed effects. In Column (2) Residential RE is replaced with Residential RE samehouse. In Column (3) Residential RE is
replaced with Residential RE sameregion. In Column (4) Residential RE is replaced with Residential RE samedirector. In Column (5)
Residential RE is replaced with Residential RE sameregion&director.
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Table 16: Cross-country Comparison Of Personal Guarantees
Country Paper Use of PGs Notes
Australia Connolly et al. (2015) >UK/US as a % of new SME loans
Ireland Carroll et al. (2015) 33% as a % of new SME loans
Japan Ono and Uesugi (2009) 67% as a % of new SME loans
Italy Calcagnini et al. (2014) 40% as % of number of new loans
Finland Peltoniemi and Vieru (2013) 30% as % of number of new loans
France Davydenko and Franks (2008) 35% value at default as % of total collateral
Spain CEET (2010) 30-45% as a % of new SME loans
UK Bank of England 29% as a % of new SME loans
UK Franks and Sussman (2005) 50-60% as % of loans to distressed companies
USA Bathala et al. (2006) 53% as a % of new SME loans
USA Meisenzahl (2014) 54% as a % of new SME loans
Notes: The table provides a summary of the results from the recent empirical literature. The %-values typically capture the share of the
number of loans at origination that are secured by a PG of a company director. The exception is Davydenko and Franks (2008) that focuses
on firms with loan exposure at default.
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Figures
Figure 1: Median Ratio Of Residential & Corporate RE To Total Assets By Firm Size Bucket
Notes: The figure shows how the ratios of residential and corporate real estate to total assets vary by firm size. The statistics are
calculated using the sample of observations for the baseline regression, covering the period 2002-2014. This excludes firms who have an
ownership stake greater than 50%, operate in certain industries, and report the main variables of interest for our regressions. Full details
on sample selection are given in Section 3.1.1. Residential Real Estate is defined by Equation 3.2, and Corporate Real Estate is defined by
Equation 3.1. Both real estate measures are scaled by “Total Assets”. The figure displays the median values of these ratios for different
firm size buckets. The firm size buckets are based on the mean “Number of Employees” the firm has over our sample period.
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Figure 2: The Impact Of A Housing Demand Shock In The DSGE Model
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Notes: The impulse responses are normalised to raise the real estate price by 1% on impact. The effects are measured in %-deviations from
the steady-state. The posterior median of the estimated parameters are used to compute the baseline impulses (black line), the shaded
area is the 90% probability region. The counterfactual responses (blue lines) are calculated by setting ω2 = 0.
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Figure 3: The Importance Of Residential Real Estate Over The UK Business Cycle
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Note: The counterfactual path of the investment is computed in three steps. First, we estimate the model and save the time series of
the structural shocks. Second, we change ω2 = 0.33 to ω2 = 0 and recompute the model’s policy functions. Third, we apply the Kalman
filter to the newly computed policy functions and the estimated time series of the structural shocks from the first step, which yields the
counterfactual investment time series (in blue).
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Appendix for Online Publication
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A UK Accounting Data
A.1 Firm Reporting Rules in the United Kingdom
The statutory reporting requirements for firms registered in the United Kingdom are mainly governed
by the Companies Act 2006 and prior to that the Companies Act 1985. The last provisions of the
Companies Act 2006 came into force on 1 October 2009. This means that firms in the United
Kingdom used varying reporting standards during our sample period, with the most relevant change
in standards for our purposes being the treatment of director’s addresses which is discussed in detail
below. The Act covers private and public limited companies. Other types of companies, for instance
Partnerships or LLPs, are covered by separate legislation but have their own reporting standards and
still must file accounts to the registrar. As described below, these are omitted from our analysis to
ensure a consistent legal basis for the type of firm under consideration.
Companies House is the Registrar of companies in the UK. The agency has the responsibility
for examining and storing all the statutory information that companies in the UK are required to
supply. Companies House also has the responsibility to make the filed information public. There
are, however, some exceptions to what a firm (or individuals that run or exert significant control
over a firm) have to make publicly available. While Companies House filings often go hand in hand
with firm tax returns (annual accounts can be filed jointly with a tax return), the information held
by the Registrar is not directly used for the purposes of calculating corporation tax. Tax returns by
firms are dealt with separately by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the United Kingdom Tax
Authority.
Reporting Requirements At the end of a firm’s fiscal year the firm must prepare a set of statutory
annual accounts that they file with Companies House. These include a version of the firm’s balance
sheet and profit and loss account. All limited firms are required to report in one way or another to
Companies House. However, reporting requirements, particularly over the annual accounts, vary by
firm size (see part 1 of the Companies House guide for additional details).
Companies House must also be informed of the firm’s name, registered office, share capital and
charges against the firm’s assets for the purposes of securing a loan. Firms must also maintain, inter-
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alia, a register of directors (including the director’s usual residential address). If any of these details
change the firm must inform Companies House via an event driven filing. Key for our purposes is the
information on directors’ usual residential addresses. One of the last provisions to be implemented
in the Companies Act 2006, on 1 October 2009, allowed firm directors the right to only publicly
disclose a service address rather than a usual residential address (although directors are still required
to report their residential address to Companies House). In Online Appendix C.3.2 we show that
this change in the law does not have a meaningful impact on our results.
Time Lags Firms have 21 months from incorporation to file their first set of accounts with Com-
panies House. Subsequent annual accounts must be filed within 9 months of the firm’s fiscal year
end for private firms and 6 months of the firm’s year end for public companies. Firms can amend
the accounts retrospectively to fix errors and present data revisions. Firms can also amend the end
of their accounting year (but not retroactively), which can lead to irregular accounting windows of
lengths different than a year. However, firms must file accounts every 18 months.
Event driven Companies House filings have shorter time lags. For instance, all appointments,
changes to personal details and cessations of a firm’s directors should be reported to Companies
House within 14 days of the changes being made.
A.2 BvD’s Collection and Coverage of Firms in the United Kingdom
Companies House is the original source of our data but our direct source is Bureau van Dijk (BvD)
who aggregate the data and provide a workable interface to access it. For the United Kingdom and
the Republic of Ireland, BvD provides firm-level data through a product called FAME (Financial
Analysis Made Easy). This is distinct from the more commonly used Amadeus and Orbis products
provided by BvD which cover firms at the European and Global level, respectively (although UK
firms form a subset in both datasets).
BvD does not source its data from Companies House directly. In between Companies House and
BvD is another data provider, Jordans, with whom we have no direct contact. Jordans serve as the
direct source for BvD. In the FAME user guide, BvD describes the logistics of the data collection
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procedure as follows:
Once accounts are filed at Companies House they are processed and checked, put onto microfiche
and made available to the public. Companies House aim for a turnaround time of 7-14 days, however
this will increase at peak times (October).
Jordans collect data from Companies House daily and transfer it from microfiche to their database
with a turnaround time of 3-5 days. This may take longer at peak times of the year (October) and
also if figures appear to be incorrect and need to be rechecked with Companies House.
Bureau van Dijk collect data from Jordans on a weekly basis and create the appropriate search
indexes to link with the FAME search software. These indexes are then tested and published to the
internet server within 48 hours of receiving the data.
In theory, this time frame would imply that most live companies in the BvD database would have
their latest accounts filed within the past year (9 months after the firm’s financial year plus one-two
months of processing time) but lags of two years are not uncommon. Given that lags can occur at
four different stages (the filing stage and the three processing stages that follow), we have not been
able to determine the root cause of this.
There are four sub-databases in FAME (A, B, C and D) which are ordered by the size of the firm
as determined by different thresholds in their accounts (e.g. balance sheet size). We have access to
and use data from all four databases to achieve the widest possible coverage.
There is conflicting information regarding how long inactive companies remain in the FAME
database. When the Bank of England contacted BvD regarding this issue, BvD’s claim was that
Jordans (their data provider) would only keep inactive companies in the database for five years, so
those firms would be lost from the source material. However, BvD would then (on a quarterly cycle)
re-upload the missing companies from their own archives ensuring that no data lost from FAME or
their other products. However, this claim may not be accurate. From inspecting different vintages of
the FAME dataset it seemed that firms did exit the database. For instance, almost 50% of firms in
the database in January 2005 were not present 10 years later. Furthermore, some 3 million companies
left the database between 2013 and 2014. We discuss this issue in more detail below.
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A.3 Treatment of the BvD UK Accounting Data
A.3.1 The Sample of BvD Vintages Used
The Bank of England received DVDs and later Blu-Ray discs from BvD on a monthly basis. These
discs contained a snapshot of the FAME database for UK firms during the month in question. We
refer to these discs as different vintages of the database. From month to month, the database is
updated both as firms filed new annual accounts and as firms conducted event driven filings with
Companies House (such as form CH01 which is used to notify Companies House of a change in the
details of a firm’s directors). However, for the majority of firms there is no change from one month
to the next as no new filings take place.
Our general principle was to sample these discs at a six monthly frequency. We did not pursue
a higher frequency as the cost in terms of the amount of time needed to process each disc and the
capacity required to store the information was excessive given how little additional information would
be gained. The recorded information for an individual firm does not change so frequently as to require
multiple observations within a six month period. In principle, since accounts are typically filed on an
annual basis, we could have also sampled the discs annually and still have guaranteed that for any
given firm, all the annual accounts filed over our sample period would have appeared as the most
recent observation in at least one of the sampled discs. However, we chose biannual sampling for
two reasons. First, firms can occasionally have irregular filing periods, if a firm changes its financial
year end date, and files twice within a year. Second, as described above, director and other firm
information can change outside of accounting periods. These are so-called event driven filings (e.g.
when a director moves house). By sampling discs at a biannual frequency we are less likely to have
event driven filings causing a deviation between the non-accounting information accurate as of when
the disc was produced and the accounting information that is accurate as of the account filing date.
Over the course of the past decade some of the Bank of England’s discs have been lost or become
damaged so we are not able to pick the same months in every year to conduct our sampling. We chose
the last available monthly disc in each half of the year - i.e. June and December are our preferred
discs for any given year. If either June or December were not available we substitute in May or
November etc. If no disc was available in a half year (for instance, if there are no discs available
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between January and June) we would use the next available disc in the following half of the year.
The complete list of discs used is below:
January 2005, December 2005, June 2006, December 2006, May 2007, December 2007, June 2008,
December 2008, May 2009, December 2009, June 2010, September 2010, September 2011, December
2011, April 2012, November 2012, August 2013, December 2013, June 2014, September 2014, August
2015.
A.3.2 Download Strategy
We focus on companies that have either a registered office or primary trading address in England,
Wales or Scotland. We exclude Northern Ireland from our sample as the Province lacks some of the
necessary property price data. Our downloads were conducted in regional blocks within each vintage
and we extracted data for both active and inactive companies. All the data we use is denominated
in GBP. The discs have an inbuilt panel structure in the sense that it is possible to download up
to 10 years of historical observations for a firm in each vintage of the database. We exploited this
by downloading the most recent observation for each firm and two years of lags for vintages in the
middle of our sample. For the first vintage (January 2005) in the sample we downloaded five years of
lagged data (ten years in the case of Land and Buildings data) to add additional historical coverage.
For the final vintage, August 2015, we downloaded the full 10 years of data in order to evaluate the
benefits of using the archived vintages versus a single snapshot of the database.
A.4 Merging the Discs into a Combined Firm Panel
Each firm in the UK is assigned a unique Companies House Registration Number (CRN) upon
formation which stays with the firm throughout its lifetime. The CRN may change if Companies
House chooses to adopt a new numbering format (see Section 1066 of the Companies Act 2006).
Fortunately this did not happen over our sample period thus we use the CRN as an identifier to
determine the same firms across different vintages of FAME. This allows us to build a firm level
panel using information across all vintages. The benefits the merged panel structure brings over a
single vintage with 10 lags of data in terms of firm coverage and reporting of variables is set out
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following the explanation of the firm panel construction.
Information held on firm directors across all the discs is separately combined to form a panel of
director characteristics, as discussed in Online Appendix B. The firm and director panels are then
merged for the regression analysis.
A.4.1 Treatment of the First Vintage
In the first vintage (January 2005), we use the additional lagged accounting information to generate
historical observations of the firm accounts. The dates of historical accounts are generated using
the “Statement Date” of the latest set of accounts and the “Number of Months” covered by the
accounting period (12 months in the vast majority of cases) to iterate backwards. For young firms,
this process can generate purported accounting periods before the firm was born. To correct for this,
all generated historical observations where the “Incorporation Date” is after the statement date are
dropped.
As discussed above, information on firm directors can change outside of accounting periods, for
example if a new director is appointed to the firm or if they move house. To determine which of the
directors present at the firm in January 2005 were present in the firm at the time of the generated
historical accounts, we use the “Director Appointment Date”. We retain directors for all generated
historical accounts whose statement date is before the director’s appointment date. To account for
directors who may have moved house since the time of the historical accounts and January 2005,
we use information on the transaction dates of the addresses listed with BvD, through merging to
the property transactions databases of the Land Registry (for England and Wales) and Registers of
Scotland (for Scotland), as discussed in detail in Online Appendix C. Information on the director’s
address is taken to be correct historically for historical accounts whose statement date is after the
most recent transaction of the director’s property prior to January 2005, at which date it is inferred
that they bought their house.
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A.4.2 Treatment of Multiple Observations on the Same Firm Accounts
Since we sample from BvD at a biannual frequency, the same set of firm accounts frequently appear
in multiple different BvD vintages (up to a maximum of 21 observations on the same accounts). The
next step in the formation of the merged panel is to bring together these multiple observations on the
same set of accounts. At this point the dataset is restricted to companies that report the statement
date of their accounts, allowing a given set of firm accounts to be uniquely identified using the CRN
and statement date. The data is broken up into three groups that are treated differently, summarised
by the following three paragraphs.
Variables Never Revised by Later Data As discussed above, information on directors is event-
driven, and can change outside of firm accounting periods. To ensure accuracy, for all director
variables, we retain information from the earliest vintage where the accounts are filed. In particular,
we omit information on directors appointed after the vintage when the accounts were first published.
Multiple trading addresses listed by the firm are treated in the same manner.
Variables Only Revised by Later Data When Initially Missing A small number of other
variables such as the “Company Status” and the “Primary Sic Code” (the primary industry to which
the firm belongs) can be changed independently of the firm accounts but take a unique value per firm
at a given point in time, and are less likely to change over time. For these variables information is used
from the earliest vintage in which the accounts appear. However, in contrast to director information,
as these variables are less likely to change over time, the initial observations on a variable are replaced
with subsequent observations if it is initially missing. Table 17 provides a stylised example of this for
variables with and without missing data. This treatment also covers lagged accounting information
by vintage.
Variables Always Revised by Later Data Unless Subsequently Missing The remaining
data are accounting variables such as “Land and Buildings” and “Number of Employees” that are
specific to the accounting period in question. Firms revise their historical accounts over time and
using the panel structure such revisions are captured. The general principle is to use the latest data
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Table 17: Treatment of Duplicate Accounts:
Variables Only Revised When Missing
Firm BvD Vintage Account Date Variable X Variable Y
1 A 31/03/2006 xA
1 B 31/03/2006 xB yB
1 C 31/03/2006 xC yC
Resolved Accounts
Firm BvD Vintage Account Date Variable X Variable Y
1 n.a. 31/03/2006 xA yB
Table 18: Treatment of Duplicate Accounts:
Variables Revised Unless Missing
Firm BvD Vintage Account Date Variable W Variable Z
1 A 31/03/2006 wA zA
1 B 31/03/2006 wB zB
1 C 31/03/2006 wC
Resolved Accounts
Firm BvD Vintage Account Date Variable X Variable Y
1 n.a. 31/03/2006 wC zB
on the firm’s accounting period for these variables, capturing improvements made to the accounts
from subsequently filed revisions. Sometimes these data revisions are only filed for the variables
that have changed, which can result in missing values on non-revised variables in later discs. To
circumvent this problem, the latest non-missing data is taken for this group of variables. Table 18
provides an example of this, for variables with and without missing data. As with the prior group of
variables the treatment here is also applied to lagged accounting information.
A.4.3 Treatment of Downloaded Lagged Accounting Information
Following the data harmonisation in the prior step, for each firm statement date there is a unique
observation for every variable. This includes the current value of accounting variables at each state-
ment date, as well as two years of lagged accounts. The next step combines this lagged accounting
data with data from previous accounts, to incorporate revised accounting data. The first step is to
identify and treat missing accounts.
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Identifying and Treating Missing Accounts The firm data is set to panel form using the firm
CRN and “Statement Date” of accounts. Before harmonising lagged accounting data with previous
accounts it is determined if any firm account observations are missing. Using the “Statement Date”
and “Number of Months” variables (length of the accounting period) it is determined if successive
accounts are the correct number of months apart. Prior to treatment, 97.8% of firm observations have
no accounts missing, with 1.8% having one set of accounts missing and 0.1% having two accounts
missing. Accounts are generated where missing accounts are identified (up to four missing accounts),
with the statement date set as the “Statement Date” of the subsequent accounts less the “Number
of Months” in the accounting period associated with that statement date (taking the last day of
the month in question). For the generated accounts, variables without lagged accounting data are
assumed to take the same value as at the first statement date after the missing accounts. Following
this treatment, 99.81% of firm observations have no accounts missing. As with the treatment for the
first vintage, observations on firm directors appointed after the “Statement Date” for the generated
accounts are removed. Variables with lagged accounting data are treated for the missing accounts in
the same way as for the rest of the dataset, as discussed next.
Harmonisation of Accounting Data. As accounting data can be revised, our general principle
is to use the latest available non-missing data. A stylised set of accounts are presented in Table
19. When there are no accounts missing for a firm and accounting data has not been revised, the
diagonal entries in the table will be the same. Thus, for example, the current value of variable x in
the 2006 accounts will be the same as the first lag of x in the 2007 accounts, which will in turn be
the same as the second lag of x in the 2008 accounts: xC,2006 = xL1,2007 = xL2,2008. Where accounting
revisions occur these values will differ.
Consider the 2006 accounts in Table 19. No accounts are missed for the subsequent two accounts
between the 2006 accounts and the two that follow (with the time between accounts equal to the
number of months covered by each of the accounts that follow) so the current data, xC,2006, and the
elements running down the diagonal of the table, xL1,2007 and xL2,2008 refer to the same accounting
variable over the same time period. In the first instance, the twice lagged accounts from two periods
ahead are used to update variable x as this is non-missing. Thus, in the resolved accounts shown
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Table 19: Treatment of Lagged Accounting Information
Firm Account Date No. Months Variable X, Current Variable X, Lag 1 Variable X, Lag 2
1 31/03/2006 12 xC,2006 xL1,2006 xL2,2006
1 31/03/2007 12 xC,2007 xL1,2007 xL2,2007
1 31/03/2008 12 xC,2008 xL1,2008 xL2,2008
1 31/03/2009 12 xC,2009 xL1,2009
Resolved Accounts
Firm Account Date No. Months Variable X, Current Variable X, Lag 1 Variable X, Lag 2
1 31/03/2006 12 xL2,2008 n.a. n.a.
1 31/03/2007 12 xL1,2008 n.a. n.a.
1 31/03/2008 12 xL1,2009 n.a. n.a.
1 31/03/2009 12 xC,2009 n.a. n.a.
below (for 2007, 2008 only), the value is xL2,2008 (which may or may not differ from xC,2006). Contrast
this with the 2007 accounts. In this case, the twice lagged accounts from two periods ahead has a
missing value for x. Further, the latest available non-missing data is the lagged accounts from one
period ahead, and so the resolved value for x in the 2007 accounts is xL1,2008. With all accounting
variables treated in this way the first and second lags in the accounts are dropped, leaving only the
current value of x at the accounting date, as shown in the resolved accounts.
A.4.4 Enhancement of Data Coverage Through Combining Vintages
The final combined panel of firms, comprised of companies with non-missing statement dates, contains
28.9 million firm-account observations, with 4.8 million unique firms. The combination of data across
several vintages has significant advantages over data extracted from a single vintage:
• First, and most straightforwardly, with a maximum of 10 sets of accounts being accessible from
a given vintage, by using multiple historical discs, a greater time period can be covered.
• Second, even within the time period covered by the 10 lagged accounts, our merged dataset
brings significant benefits in terms of coverage of the accounting information firms report. To
demonstrate this, we downloaded 10 accounts for each firm from the August 2015 vintage and
compared the value of firm’s “Total Assets”, a particularly well-reported variable, to the same
variable over the same set of 10 accounts using the data as created from the our combined
dataset using all 21 vintages. The proportion of observations for which “Total assets” are
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Figure 4: Proportion of Observations with Total Assets Missing
Notes: the figure displays the proportion of total assets missing among companies with a non-missing statement date.
One vintage refers to the 10 lagged accounts downloaded for the companies present in the August 2015 vintage. Full
dataset refers to the final panel of firms produced from the 21 vintages from 2005 to 2015, as described above, covering
the same period.
missing from each dataset is shown in Figure 4. Using the combined dataset, “Total Assets”
is consistently well-reported, as shown in red, with data missing for only around 3% of firm
observations throughout the sample. Data downloaded only from the 2015 vintage has similar
coverage of “Total Assets” for the first five accounts, before dropping off substantially, with
around a third of observations missing this data by the final lagged accounts.
• Third, the combined dataset has significantly greater coverage of firms. Figure 5 displays the
proportion of companies present in each accounting year in our combined dataset that are still
present in the August 2015 vintage. Only 55% of the companies that filed accounts in 2000
are still present in the August 2015 vintage. Note, this is not the requirement that the firm
accounts from 2000 are present in the 2015 vintage, only that information on the firm itself is
still present. The difference in asset reporting in Figure 4 is driven largely by firms exiting the
database before the 2015 vintage. Indeed, 94% of the firm observations where “Total Assets”
is reported in the full panel but not from the 2015 vintage have had their “Company Status”
become no longer Live at a date prior to 2015.
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Figure 5: Fraction of Firms Present in August 2015 vintage
Notes: the figure displays the proportion of firms in each statement year, as derived from the full set of 21 vintages,
that are present in the August 2015 vintage.
A.5 Sample Selection
Our key sample selection criteria are articulated in the main text; for completeness here we describe
the conditions under which companies and observations can enter our sample.
• We restrict our sample to only include limited liability, for profit companies to which the
Companies Act applies. Specifically, we include “Private Limited”, “Public AIM”, “Public
Quoted”, “Public Not Quoted”. This information is contained in the “Legal Form” field in the
FAME database.
• For a firm-year observation to be included, the firm must have had a “Company Status” of Live
when the accounts were first filed.
• We exclude firms in certain industries based on the “primary UK SIC code” field in the FAME
database which is available for the 2003 UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
for all the discs used in our sample. We exclude from the sample firms operating in utilities
(2003-SIC: 4011-4100), construction (2003-SIC: 4511-4550), finance and insurance (2003-SIC:
6511-6720), real estate (2003-SIC: 7011-7032), public administration (2003-SIC: 7511-7530),
and mining (2003-SIC: 1010-1450). Firms occasionally switch industry, we take the modal
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value across the firm’s observations and resolve ties in favour of the highest number to assign
a firm to the same industry for the complete sample.
• We exclude companies that have a parent or are part of a group. Our criteria for doing so is
whether the firm reports an ultimate owning company on FAME. Those that do not report
an ultimate owner company or whose ultimate owning company name is the same as the firm
name remain in the sample. Crucially, the ownership information in FAME is only accurate as
of the vintage of the database. There is no historical information within FAME about whether
or not a firm had an ultimate owner. The use of historical vintages of the database allows us
to circumvent this issue. As with director information, we always take data on ownership from
the earliest vintage available after a company has filed its annual accounts.
• As our empirical analysis relies upon a mix of flows, stocks and changes in stocks, we exclude
observations where the accounting period is irregular, e.g. if the firm filed two sets of accounts
within a year. Specifically, we use the BvD field “Number of Months Since Last Accounts”
and exclude observations where this is not equal to 12 months. Observations where there is no
information on the filing date are excluded.
• We exclude companies where no information on the firm’s location is recorded. That is to say
the “R/O Address”, “Primary Trading Address”, and the first “Trading Address” fields are all
missing.
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B Firm Director Characteristics
B.1 Construction of the Firm Director Panel
B.1.1 Treatment of Directors Within BvD Vintages
To form the panel of director characteristics, we first extract information on all directors contained in
each of the 21 vintages of BvD. Key fields on the personal characteristics are the directors “Director
Full Name” , “Director Surname”, “Director Title”, “Date of Birth”, “Full Address”, “Director Full
Postcode”, “Director Nationality”, and “Director Gender”.50 We also collect information on the firms
the director is associated with on each date, including its “Registered Number” (CRN, the firm
identifier), and the “Director Appointment Date” and “Director Resignation Date” (if applicable)
of all roles that the director held at the firm (note that directors sometimes resign and are then
reappointed). There can be multiple firm observations for the same director at a given point in time,
reflecting their roles at multiple different companies.
Within each vintage, we then clean the data in the following fashion:
• We exclude directors who are firms. Under the Companies Act, every firm must have at least
one director who is a natural person; however, the firm may also have additional directors who
are themselves firms (director-firms). For instance, an accountancy firm may sit on the board of
directors. Including such entities makes no sense from the point of view of our research question.
In the earlier vintages of BvD there is not a variable that flags whether a director is a firm or
an individual. Instead, we identify director-firms as those whose full name/surname is recorded
but the date of birth and first name/initial is missing (as neither of these fields are recorded
for directors who are firms but are required for directors who are individuals). As a further
measure, we flag director-firms as those whose “Director Full Name” includes one of over 35
common expressions for a firm name such as “Limited”, “LTD”, “Accountants”, “Secretaries”
and “Corporation”. In the latter vintages of the database there is a variable which explicitly
flags whether a director is an individual or a firm (“Director Individual or Company”). Testing
against this variable we find that our method for identifying whether a director is an individual
50For some vintages we only observe “Director Initial”/”Director First Name” and “Director Surname”.
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or a firm is accurate in over 99.99% of cases. Given this accuracy, for consistency over time, we
use the method for flagging director-firms based on missing date of birth and initial throughout
the dataset.
• All but the first three vintages used (the two in 2005 and the first in 2006) have a variable
indicating whether an individual is male or female. For the first three discs, we impute the
director’s gender using different information. We first use the “Director Title” (e.g. Mr or Mrs)
to assign genders. However, some titles are gender-neutral, such as Dr. For these individuals,
the gender is assigned based on the 1000 most popular male and female baby names from the
1970s (to match common ages of the directors by the time of the discs).
• The information on director nationality is condensed into an indicator of whether the director
is from the U.K. or not. This includes corrections for a number of different potential spellings
that occur, including “UK”, “United Kingdom”, as well as the countries that make up the UK.
B.1.2 Forming the Director Identification Key
We then combine the information from the 21 vintages of BvD together by generating a key to
identify the same individual, both through vintages, and across different companies at a given point
in time. Our identification key is formed for individuals based on their first initial, surname, and
date of birth. We have sufficient information to compute this key in every BvD vintage we use. We
then take the following steps to clean the variables that enter the key:
• The “Director Surname” string is cleaned to remove any prefixes, suffixes, initials and titles
that are on occasion mistakenly included in the surname field.
• “Date of Birth” is present in 92% of cases, allowing this form of identification key to be computed
for the majority of individuals. In some of the missing cases, the date of birth can be imputed
based on repeat observations on an individual at the same company. Specifically, we assume that
surname and initial are sufficient to identify an individual within a company. With multiple
observations on the same director in the same company over time, it is possible that the
individual’s date of birth is present in some vintages and absent in others. In such cases,
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the missing date of birth is imputed, so long as the initial and last name are associated with
a unique date of birth within the company over time. The date of birth is missing for the
remaining group of individuals. However, if their initials and surname are associated with a
unique company across all the discs, this is assumed sufficient to uniquely identify them. The
individuals that don’t fall into these groups (around 5% of the sample) cannot be uniquely
identified across companies and over time and are dropped.
Note that on this basis there are 9.7 million unique surname/initial/date of birth combinations. We
cannot guarantee that our key identifies every director uniquely, particularly for individuals with
common surnames. However, since the population of directors is smaller compared to the country
as a whole, collision probabilities are sufficiently low not to introduce meaningful measurement error
into our analysis.
B.1.3 Cleaning Across Discs
There can be observations on the same director across their roles in multiple firms or in multiple roles
within firms. We use these multiple observations to fill in missing data and correct for inaccuracies
of the data. For the director gender and whether the individual is foreign, we take the modal value
across all observations on the individual, with ties resolved in favor of the dominant category in the
population (male and U.K. national, respectively). This unique value is then used to fill any missing
observations for the individual.
With individuals uniquely identified and their personal characteristics cleaned, the next step is to
extract information on the positions held at each firm. The unit of observation now is an individual’s
role at a given company. These roles are identified based on the Companies House number of the
firm, the director identification key, and their appointment and resignation dates at the firm. Several
cleaning steps are performed to produce these groups.
• There are a very small number of observations (0.09%) where the appointment date is later in
time than the resignation date. From comparing these observations to the Companies House
website, it appears that these are due to mistakes in which resignation or appointment dates are
conflated from different times an individual worked at the same company. Such observations
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are dropped. Observations (1.51%) are also dropped for cases where the individual is appointed
to the company on the same day as they resign. From comparison to Companies House, these
appear to be genuine cases, and in communication with Companies House it was confirmed
that this can occur, if, for example, an individual is appointed only for one day to register the
company. These observations are excluded as the focus of this paper is on individuals who have
a meaningful role at a company.
• The director appointment date is missing for 0.16% of observations. If the individual has at
most one role recorded with the firm in every vintage of BvD, we fill in missing appointment
dates with data from other vintages. Following this treatment, the appointment date is only
missing for 0.05% of observations. The remaining observations are dropped.
• Companies House first collected data on firm directors during 1991 and 1992. To initialise their
database, Companies House took a snapshot of existing directors in the most recently filed
company accounts. As historical information on appointment dates was not available, the date
was simply taken as the date of the most recent company accounts, many of which would be
prior to 1991, given the filing lags. To ensure consistency for such cases, appointment dates
prior to 1991 are all coded to the 1st of January 1991. This affects around 2% of observations.
• Resignation dates for the same role are naturally missing for vintages of BvD that predate
the resignation. We correct for this using the information from subsequent vintages and build
a consistent set of appointment and resignation dates for each role the director has at the
company (distinguishing between roles when the director has resigned and is reappointed).
In the dataset, it sometimes turns out that an individual is identified as having multiple directorships
in the same company at the same time. Ultimately what is of interest for this paper is whether the
individual has a role with the company at a given point in time, not whether there are multiple such
directorships. Further cleaning is used to make these roles as parsimonious as possible, documenting
the periods when the individual had a role at the company. Consider two roles held by a director in
the same company with respective appointment and resignation dates (a1, r1) , (a2, r2). Three types
of categories are treated:
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1. Duplicate roles: a1 = a2, r1 = r2: this is condensed to a single role from a1 to r1.
2. Subset roles: a1 ≤ a2, r2 ≤ r1: this is condensed to a single role from a1 to r1.
3. Overlapping roles: a1 ≤ a2,r1 ≤ r2: this is condensed to a single role from a1 to r2.
This process is run over all roles from all 21 vintages and repeated several times to condense all the
roles, enabling treatment of, for example, three overlapping roles which only overlap in pairs.
The final step is to expand the dataset to a monthly panel of director roles. This allows for
accurate matching with company accounts data, which can be filed in any month of the year. Each
role is expanded to a set of monthly observations, running from the last observation on the role to 24
months prior to the appointment date of the director in the role. With almost all company accounts
filed at least every 24 months, this allows a match between the director role and the most recently
filed accounts prior to their appointment.
B.1.4 Company Information
We selected a small number of well-reported company variables for the calculation of director char-
acteristics:
• “Company Status:” an indicator of whether the firm is live, or in some other state such as
dormant or dissolved.
• “Primary SIC Code”: the primary industry classification of the company, based on the 2003
UK Standard Industry Classification.
• “Total Assets”: the total assets reported on the firm balance sheet.
• “Incorporation Date:” the date the firm was incorporated and registered with Companies House.
Data on these, and other variables, are taken from each of the 21 BvD vintages sampled and combined
into a cleaned panel of firm information, following the same account cleaning procedure as the main
firm level dataset.
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B.2 Calculation of Director Characteristics
We merge the cleaned company information onto the monthly director panel at the months of the
company accounts. This firm level information is then filled out in the monthly panel for all the
dates until the next accounts are due to be published (this due date is not proceeded beyond if
the subsequent accounts are missing). Specifically, company variables for all dates between the
accounting statement at t and the accounting statement at t+ 1 are filled out with information from
the accounting statement at t.
We use the combined monthly panel of director information and company information to calculate
a number of different characteristics for individuals at monthly frequency, broken into three groups.
Personal Characteristics
• Age: the number of days between the individual’s date of birth and filing date, expressed in
years.
• Male: a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the director is male.
• Non-UK : a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the director is not a U.K. national.
Metrics Based on Current Information
• Current Number Of Roles: the number of live companies the individual is currently a director
of in a given month.
• Average Company Asset Growth: the average asset growth taken across all the live companies
the individual is currently a director of in a given month.
Measures of Experience
A significant limitation of analysing director characteristics using BvD data at a given point in time
is that prior experience the individual had can be lost. This is because previous roles individuals
held are periodically removed as the BvD dataset is updated over time. Using information from 21
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different vintages of BvD data circumvents this issue and enables accurate calculation of a number
of metrics that summarise the experience individuals have had in all their roles, including those in
the past. We calculate a number of measures of experience at monthly frequency:
• Number Of Roles: the number of different companies the individual has been a director of.
This measure does not double-count two separate periods in which an individual is a director
at the same company.
• Experience: the amount of time the individual has been a director, calculated across all compa-
nies. For each month, this metric counts the number of different live companies the individual
was a director of during that month and sums this over time, expressing the result in years. The
treatment of overlapping roles in the same company in the prior section enables an accurate
calculation.
• Average Time Spent at a Firm: average number of years a director spent at each company,
derived from the prior two series.
• Experience Of Leaving Firms: the number of different companies the individual has resigned
from. As with experience of different companies, resignations from the company at two different
points in time are not counted twice.
• Firms With At Birth: the number of different companies where the individual was appointed
in the same month the company was incorporated.
• Firms That Have Failed: the number of different companies the individual has worked for that
have died. The death of the company is timed to the statement date of the first set of accounts
where the “Company Status” is dissolved.
• Number Of Industries Worked In: the number of different two digit SIC code industries the
individual has worked in.
With these director characteristics calculated, company balance sheet variables and variables specific
to an individual’s role at a given company are dropped and the unit of observation is compressed
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from an individual’s role in a given company to the individual. This results in a monthly panel,
with information on individuals and their characteristics through time. This final dataset runs from
January 1998 to August 2015, and has just over 1 billion observations.
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C Matching Residential Addresses of Firm Directors
C.1 Background and General Principles
C.1.1 The Structure of Addresses in the UK
While tedious, it is useful to first lay out what a UK address typically looks likes to fix ideas ahead of
explaining how our matching algorithm works. We do not use any street, town or regional information
(beyond England and Wales versus Scotland as described below) when matching addresses. Instead,
our highest unit of observation is postal codes, or postcodes for short. In the UK, postcodes are 5
to 7 characters separated by a space (for example, “EC2M 1BB”). The final three characters always
have the same structure: a number followed by two letters and denote the immediate local area of the
property. The first set of characters, between two and four, will always start with one or two letters,
and will then be followed by either a single digit number, a two digit number or, as in the example,
a number followed by a letter. This first set of characters denote different UK localities so that, for
instance, addresses in the same town will have postcodes starting with the same three characters.
These patterns make postcodes distinctive and easy to map into the regions we use for our empirical
analysis. Furthermore, as far as we are aware, this pattern is unique to the UK and therefore allows
us to identify postcodes that are from addresses outside the UK. Crucially, there are close to 1.75
million postcodes in the UK serving just under 30 million unique addresses, meaning that the average
number of properties per postcode is about 17 (although the total number of addresses per postcode
can vary between 1 and 100).51 Once we know a director’s postcode, we have essentially narrowed
down where he or she lives to a small number of properties. In all the databases we use the postcode
is a separate field.
For around 80% of addresses in the UK the property can be uniquely identified using its postcode
and the house number (i.e. the number of the property on the street). Specifically, for 10,339,712
of the 12,448,142 unique addresses in the England and Wales Land Registry the property can be
uniquely identified in this way. For the Scottish Land Registry the equivalent figure is 702 thousand
51Postcodes that identify a single address tend to be for commercial properties that receive a lot of post and are less
relevant in the residential sphere.
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out of 976 thousand.52 This means that given an unstructured text string for the address, simply
isolating the first number and postcode would be sufficient for the purposes of matching in around
80% of cases. (Although this would be a biased set of addresses as it ignores properties that are
named or those that are parts of larger buildings such as flats or apartments).
Around 10% or so of addresses in the UK are uniquely identified by a property name (i.e. a string
like “the East Farm” or “Green Manor” etc.) and the postcode. Some addresses have both a house
name and a house number in which case the name is redundant for matching purposes. For example,
if a property is called The Manor, 72 High Street; there should never be another be another property
at 72, High Street. The name is decorative.
Beyond this set, the structure of the address can get a bit more complicated for four main reasons:
1. When the property number is a range (e.g. 1-2).
2. When the property is part of a bigger building e.g. Flat 1, 6 the Avenue.
3. The address has been entered with a typo.
4. The address is non-residential or has a unusual structure.
As described below, our matching algorithm can work to deal with 1 and 2 above. And while it is
possible to adjust for some typos (for example, the incorrect entry of the number 1 with a capital I), it
is not possible to write an algorithm that corrects for every possible error. Furthermore, sometimes
it is simply not possible to process the address in a coherent way – this is particularly true for
non-residential addresses which we are not interested in.
C.1.2 Data Sources
We have three databases containing address information: (i) the director address information from
BvD; (ii) the England & Wales Land Registry covering residential property transactions in England
& Wales since 1995 and (iii) the Registers of Scotland covering property transactions in Scotland
(both commercial and residential) since 2003. All three record address information in different ways,
52Note, the Scottish figures are calculated after we have removed transactions with missing information.
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with only the BvD database recording it as a raw string, so one needs to clean the data first in order
to put it in a comparable form.
C.1.3 Our Approach to Matching
Given the fact that UK addresses often have a well defined structure and that the way that address
information is recorded across our three data sources is different, we decided to use a precise matching
approach as opposed to using fuzzy matching. Our general approach to matching is to generate 5
common variables: (i) Postcode – this is listed as a separate string in all databases; (ii) house_num
– this is a street number, e.g. 1a; (iii) flat_num – this is the number of the flat, e.g. flat 15; (iv)
house_name – this is the name of the building, e.g. The West Building; (v) flat_name – this is
a potential name for the flat, e.g. Garden Flat. Flat_name is the least populated and will be the
hardest to match on since it seems like addresses typically have a flat number assigned as well which
may not have been listed. Below, we describe some of the rules we use to isolate these 5 individual
address elements. It is worthwhile emphasising that sometimes the address information is ambiguous
and judgment needs to be used. The way we set up the algorithm means that false positives are
unlikely (we have not encountered one in our manual testing). Even so, if a false match were to
occur, this would have to be within a postcode meaning that the property values are likely to be
similar among addresses (although the transaction dates will of course be incorrect).
The matching algorithm puts together 5 different potential matching strings (string construction
using Stata syntax):
1. matcher1=postcode+("_")+house_num+("_")+flat_num+("_1") if house_num is not miss-
ing.
2. matcher2=postcode+("_")+house_num+("_")+flat_name+("_1") if house_num is not miss-
ing.
3. matcher3=postcode+("_")+house_name+("_")+flat_num+("_1") if house_name is not miss-
ing.
95
4. matcher4=postcode+("_")+house_name+("_")+flat_name+("_1") if house_name is not miss-
ing.
5. matcher5=postcode+("_")+house_name+("_")+house_num+("_1") if house_num is not miss-
ing.
We build each of these 5 matchers in each database, then merge the databases based on each matcher
to identify potential shared address information between the Land Registries and BvD. If more than
one matcher works, we have the following preference ordering: 12345.
Some remarks are necessary regarding these matching strings. First, with this structure it is
impossible to match based on flat information alone. Second, we also take the step of dropping
situations where a particular matcher does not uniquely identify a property within a database; for
instance matcher4 will be unable to uniquely identify numbered flats in a single building. Third,
matcher5 may seem redundant but is designed to address situations where the algorithm incorrectly
assigns a flat name to a house_name; as it is only relevant in the case of an error we treat it as
the match with the lowest priority (see above). Fourth, matcher1 and matcher2 will give identical
matches if no flat information is available.
C.2 Details of Address Fields in our three Data Sources
Here we describe how address information is stored in our three databases. In all three databases we
clean the address strings in a similar manner, e.g. by removing double spaces, certain punctuation,
using a single case, consistent treatment of numbers etc. Furthermore, in our treatment of the
individual address fields there are multiple specific cases that we have dealt with in our code. Some
of the more common problems are discussed in the following section; however, we do not wish to go
into all these often quite tedious details here nor is it practical to do so, instead our cleaning code is
available upon request.
C.2.1 The England and Wales Land Registry
This database is the best structured of the three under consideration. Ignoring fields at the street
level or above, address information is saved as the postcode and two string fields called the “Primary
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Table 20: Extract of Address Information from the England and Wales Land Registry
Land Registry Address Fields Matching Algorithm Fields
postcode paon saon house_num house_name flat_num flat_name
PO345DX EAST GREEN eastgreen
SA181UN 38 38
KT199UG 162 162
ME142HH 24A 24a
PO211DQ 44 FLAT 1 44 1
PO211SU 10 - 12 10-12
SW147LY 23 23
SW66RE 28 28
W129EA 6A 6a
W1G9XF 15 FLAT 1 15 1
BN29AB EBENEZER APARTMENTS, 24 FLAT 27 24 ebenezerapartments 27
Notes: The table shows a random extract of 9 unique addresses from the England and Wales Land Registry. The 10th address is selected
to show a more complex example. The left half of the table is how the data appears in the raw data. The right half of the table shows how
these fields are translated into the field for our matching algorithm.
Addressable Object Name” (paon) and “Secondary Addressable Object Name” (saon). The secondary
address characteristics typically contain information on the sub building, i.e. flat name or number.
The paon typically contains information on the main building, so house number, house name or the
name of the apartment block. Table 20 contains a short extract from the relevant fields from the
Land Registry. The dataset is also clean: the postcode field is 99.9% populated and, when reported,
always corresponds to the UK conventions described above. The paon variable has only 4,250 missing
values out of 21.3 million transactions. Very occasionally (467 cases) saon is listed but paon is not,
in which case we replace the missing paon with saon. The saon variable is less well reported but this
reflects the structure of addresses in the UK as described above. Table 21 shows a breakdown of how
the addresses fields are recorded for all the unique addresses in the Land Registry (i.e. after we have
collapsed addresses that transacted more than once into a single observation; we group by postcode,
paon and saon to do this).
Our general approach to identifying the matching variables is the following. First, consider
numbers. For the overwhelming majority of observations, the address information will contain only
up to two sets of numbers (we define a range like 1-2 as a single set of numbers). If only one number
is available then we assign it to house_num. If there is a number in both saon and a number in paon,
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Table 21: Breakdown of Address Information in the England and Wales Land Registry
Number of Unique Addresses Share of Unique Addresses (%)
Raw Data
Report paon 12,444,713 99.97
- only report paon 11,090,100 89.09
- paon is a number* 10,717,301 86.10
- paon is a string** 1,369,667 11.00
Report saon 1,354,613 10.90
- saon contains the word “flat” 870,965 7.00
- saon contains the word “apartment” 115,826 0.93
Cleaned Data
Report house_num 11,077,155 88.99
- only report house_num 10,339,712 83.06
Report house_name 1,731,071 13.91
- only report house_name 687,957 5.53
Report flat_num/flat_name 933,168 7.50
Total 12,448,142 100.00
Notes: Breakdown of unique addresses appearing in the England and Wales Land Registry. A unique addresses is one where there is a
unique combination of soan, paon and postcode. Excludes addresses in the Land Registry where the postcode is missing. Our England and
Wales Land Registry data covers transactions over the period Jan 1995 - April 2016.
* paon is a number includes cases such as paon=15C or paon=1-2.
** all cases where paon contains no numeric character (note that paon can contain both numbers and letters: e.g. paon= “9, Manor
House”).
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then we will assign the saon number to the flat_num and the number in paon to the house_num
(e.g saon = “4”, paon = ”1-2” would imply flat_num = “4”, house_num = “1-2”). If there are two
numbers in either paon or saon then we assign the first to flat_num and the second to house_num.
An exception to this rule would be if we can identify clearly which number corresponds to a flat
number (e.g. paon = “1, flat 3”), then the algorithm reassigns the ordering appropriately.
Turning to the name variables. The general principle is similar, flat_name will be a string in
saon, house_name a string in paon. We take the obvious step of removing any identified numbers
from these strings and any sub strings that also align with the street. One source of ambiguity is
whether, when paon is just a number, the string in saon is the house_name or the flat_name. We
then use some simple keyword tests to assign the string to the appropriate field.
As the registry is a database of transactions and we wish to identify all the transactions at a
particular address, we convert the registry to a wide format using the three raw address fields to
isolate unique addresses before matching.
C.2.2 The Registers of Scotland
The Registers of Scotland database has a similar structure to its English equivalent; the four relevant
address fields are subbuilding, buildingname, propertynumber and postcode. Between them building-
name and propertynumber are supposed to contain similar information as paon above except that
propertynumber is a numeric field (all other fields are strings). If the property is identified by a
number then propertynumber is populated; properties that have property numbers that contain a
string (e.g. 11a) or a range (1-2) are listed in buildingname. Similarly subbuilding contains is similar
information to saon above. Table 22 contains an extract from the database.
The data in the Registers of Scotland database is less clean than the England and Wales Land
Registry. Many more observations are missing (e.g. the postcode is missing for 197,871 observations),
and there is less consistency in the way information is recorded across the different fields between
observations (compare for instance the first and second to last observation in Table 22). If the
observed transaction has insufficient information to form a match (which is the case when either
postcode is missing or all three of the other variables are missing) then we drop the observation. We
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Table 22: Extract of Address Information from the Registers of Scotland
Registers of Scotland Address Fields Matching Algorithm Fields
postcode propertynumber buildingname subbuilding house_num house_name flat_num flat_name
AB245PD 34 FLAT F 34 f flatf
AB253DB 20 20
AB210LY 6 6
AB116UQ 51C 51c
AB116JB 162
AB116JR 32A 32a
AB219UT 19 19
AB423DW 2 WESTERTON 2 westerton
AB2 3UE 27 FLAT E 27 e flate
ABN54503 MILLDALE 68-72 FLAT 4 68-72 milldale 4
Notes: The table shows a random extract of 9 unique addresses from the Registers of Scotland database. The 10th address is selected to
show a more complex example. The left half of the table shows how the data appears in the raw data. The right half of the table shows
how these fields are translated into the field for our matching algorithm.
Table 23: Breakdown of Address Information in the Registers of Scotland Database
Number of Unique Addresses Share of Unique Addresses (%)
Cleaned Data
Report house_num 774,004 92.42
- only report house_num 690,708 82.47
Report house_name 87,875 10.39
- only report house_name 55,048 6.57
Report flat_num/flat_name 69,142 8.26
Total 837,491 100.00
Notes: A unique addresses is one where there is a unique combination of house_num, house_name, flat_name, flat_num and postcode.
Addresses that emerge from transactions where any of the postcode, date, price, or all of buildingname, propertynumber and subbuilding
are missing, are excluded. Our Registers of Scotland data covers transactions over the period April 2003 - September 2014.
100
also exclude transactions where the price paid or the date of the transaction is missing. This leaves
us with 1,376,888 usable transactions.
Despite these issues there is sufficient data quality to determine our four matching fields for
837,401 unique addresses. Our approach to numbering is to use propertynumber in the first instance
to identify house_num. In the case where propertynumber is missing (e.g. the fourth row in Table
22), we would then isolate the number from buildingname (51c). If buildingname and propertynumber
report conflicting numbers we assume that the former is the flat_num. If propertynumber is missing,
we would prioritise numbers in buildingname over subbuilding for house_num with a number in latter
being used for the flat_num. An exception of this latter rule is if buildingname is clearly marked
as referring to a flat (e.g. buildingname=”FLAT 2”, subbuilding=56 would mean that we assign
flat_num=2 and house_num=56).
For the name fields, we prioritise strings in buildingname for house_name and strings in subbuild-
ing for flat_num. We also attempt to extract flat_name from the strings using keyword searches in
case the string contains multiple elements of an address.
The inconsistency in the way the same information can be recorded across fields in the Registers
of Scotland database means that it is possible that the same address is entered in two different ways
in the raw data. To address this, we first cleaned the address information for each transaction and
then determined unique addresses using our cleaned data fields. Table 23 presents the breakdown of
the address information for the cleaned data.
As with the England and Wales registry we convert the Scottish registry into a wide format.
However, for the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, we group transactions by the cleaned
address fields rather than the raw data.
C.2.3 Director Addresses in BvD
In BvD there are two fields that contain director address information: directoraddress and director-
postcode.53 The latter is equivalent to the postcode in the other two databases. There is a small
data quality issue regarding postcodes: in about 0.3% of cases directors give the shortened 3 digit
53In some vintages of BvD these fields are titled directorfulladdress and directorfullpostcode.
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version (corresponding to the region where the address is located) rather than the full postcode. We
attempt to correct for this by exploiting our panel structure by looking at multiple address listings
by the same director (where the property number matches) to try to complete the postcode.
The field directoraddress is the full address of the director written as string with each line of the
address separated by a comma. For reference, to use a publicly available address rather than that of
an individual, the Bank of England’s address would be written as: “Bank of England, Threadneedle
Street, London, EC2R 8AH, United Kingdom”. We split the full addresses into its individual parts
dividing the string about the commas. We focus only on the first two lines of the address as new
fields (in the example, we would have two fields “Bank of England” and “Threadneedle Street”).
For numbers, we assume that if only a single one exists in the two fields then it corresponds to
the house_num (including a range like 1-2). If two numbers are present we assume the first is the
flat_num, unless the string is of the form where the flat number is obvious such as “1 potter street flat
3”. Flat_name is isolated using key word searches. Having isolated these three terms, any residual
string left in the first line of the address is classified as the house_num. If there is nothing left in the
first line of the address we use the residual string from the second line. With house_num we also
use a combination of regular expressions and keyword searches to remove road and town names from
the string as well as any sub-strings containing the postcode.
C.3 Performance of the Algorithm
Of all the unique director addresses located in England, Wales, and Scotland listed in Bureau van
Dijk, 47% can be matched to at least one transaction in either Land Registry. The figure for ad-
dresses located in England and Wales is 48%, the figure for addresses in Scotland is 35%. The lower
match rate in Scotland has two explanations. First, the Registers of Scotland database only contains
transactions starting in April 2003. This increases the share of Scottish properties where no transac-
tion has been recorded compared to England and Wales, where there is an additional eight years of
transaction information. Second, the increased incidence of missing data in the Registers of Scotland
data means that the record of transactions we have for the post 2003 period is less complete. Note
also that only 5.8% of directors’ addresses are located in Scotland.
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Figure 6 presents the match rate for addresses based upon the vintage of the BvD database
when the address is first listed as well as the share of addresses that enter the database at each
vintage. Two main points stand out. First, there is a break in the match rate that happens around
the December 2009 vintage. Prior to that vintage the match rate is a little under 60%, after that
vintage the match rate falls to a little below 40%. This is due to a change in the law regarding the
disclosure of addresses which we discuss in more detail below. Second, two thirds of the addresses
in question entered the BvD database after our first vintage in 2005 and the average rate of entry is
somewhat stable at roughly 2700 new addresses per day (calculated as total new addresses divided
by days between disks). However, there is an unexplained spike in entry in June 2008 where the rate
increases to approximately 4500 new addresses per day with a lull in the period before and after.
Also note that we have presented our match rates in terms of unique addresses, rather than
weighting by address incidence. This means that we are potentially putting too much weight on
addresses where the director has a short tenure and therefore is of less relevance empirically. However,
if we sample addresses according to their incidence in the database (i.e. addresses that appear in
more director-firm-years get more weight) we also get a match rate of 47%.
As discussed below, we can also obtain an estimate of the value of a director’s house through
matching director-address pairs to mortgage data. This allows us to match the house value of
directors whose properties have not transacted since the start of our Land Registries, but have taken
out a new mortgage, for example, a remortgage. Including this additional source of information
increases the match rate. The match rate is also higher when we focus on directors who have a
current job at a live company, which ensures that address information is kept up to date. Using the
Land Registries and mortgage dataset, and focusing on directors with current jobs at live companies,
the match rate rises to 58% during the period of our regression sample from 2002-2014. When we
further restrict ourselves to the directors of the companies that appear in our regression sample, this
match rate rises to 65%.
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Figure 6: Match Rate across BvD Vintages
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Notes: This chart shows the match rate between director addresses in the BvD and the Land Registry (black diamonds, left hand axis).
Specifically, the match rate is calculated as the number of addresses in BvD for which a corresponding transaction can be found in either
registry divided by the number of properties that have a postcode in England, Wales or Scotland. We present these rates by the the vintage
of the BvD database where the address first appears. The bars, right hand axis, represent the share of addresses that first appear in each
BvD vintage.
C.3.1 Manual Tests on the Matching Algorithm
As we only succeed in matching roughly half of directors’ addresses to the Land Registries, it is
informative to ask what the cause is when our methodology fails to match an address. To explore
this, we randomly selected 100 unmatched unique addresses from the September 201054 BvD vintage
and manually assessed the reason for the failed matches. Of the 100 unmatched addresses, 8 failed
matches were due to differences in the way the addresses were recorded in BvD compared to the Land
Registries, for example due to typos. Six addresses were not matched due to obviously being a business
address (as opposed to residential addresses). Recall that the England and Wales Land Registry does
not include commercial property.55 The remaining unmatched addresses were addresses that did not
appear commercial by inspection (although it is not possible to say with certainty that they are
residential) but did still not appear in either Land Registry. There are two potential explanations
for this: either the property has not transacted since 1995 (2003 in the case of Scotland) or the only
transactions that took place at the address were those omitted from the Land Registry. In terms
54For complete clarity: we used a snapshot of all addresses available at that vintage, not those addresses that were
first listed in the September 2010 vintage.
55The Registers of Scotland dataset does include properties that are purchased by corporations but these are flagged
and we exclude them from our analysis.
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of the latter, one relevant omitted set of transactions are the purchase of houses using a Buy-to-Let
mortgage. One may be concerned that these are directors that live in rental properties. However,
for reasons we describe in the main text this is unlikely. Another culprit is likely business addresses
that cannot obviously be classified as commercial by inspecting their names. We discuss the law
regarding directors using a commercial address below. It does seem, however, that many of the
unmatched addresses are those where the owner has not sold their property since 1995 (2003 in the
case of Scotland).
C.3.2 Changes to the Law Regarding the Listing of Director’s Usual Residential Ad-
dresses
Under Sections 288 and 289 of the Companies Act 1985, the usual residential address of firm directors
had to be entered on the public registrar of companies held at Companies House. This address would
be published in their firm’s accounts and this forms the source of our data on addresses.
From April 2nd 2002,56 directors had the option to waive this requirement if the director was
successful in obtaining a confidentiality order, having demonstrated to the Secretary of State that
placing their residential address on the public record would place them or someone living with them
at risk of violence or intimidation, for example from political groups. In this case the director could
remove their residential address from public record and replace it with a service address at which
they could be reached, for example their firm address, with the residential address held securely and
only accessible by Competent Authorities. The bar for obtaining such an order is high. We discussed
this issue with Companies House and they estimated that less than 1% of directors are beneficiaries
of a confidentiality order at any given date.
A more material change in UK law on the 1st October 200957 meant that all directors had the
option of having a service address displayed publicly rather than their usual residential address after
this date. Usual residential addresses are still required alongside service addresses but the former are
kept confidential at the director’s request. This is the source of the decline in the match rate seen in
Figure 6 after the May 2009 vintage of BvD: directors started reporting service addresses, which are
56The insertion of Sections 723B to E into the Companies Act 1985 became effective on this date.
57Specifically, the implementation of Sections 162-167 (register of directors) of the 2006 Companies Act.
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commercial and not in the Land Registry, rather than their residential addresses. However, the law
was not applied retrospectively: all residential addresses held on public record at Companies House
prior to 1st October 2009 continue to be held after this date. Thus, there would not be a material
increase in privacy for directors through replacing their residential address with a service address
unless the director moved house. In the data there is no spike in new addresses entering the database
in 2009/2010: around 1.3 million new addresses entered the database in 2008 compared to 800,000
in 2009 (for the three year period 2006-2008 2.8 million new addresses where registered compared to
2.7 million three years 2009-2011).
For the purpose of our analysis, this legal change has little impact since we fix both the composition
of directors and their houses in 2002. Only directors who move or are appointed (for the first time)
after 2009 are affected by this change in the law but this variation is not included in our analysis.
However, to be completely sure this is not distorting our results, in Table 24 we rerun our baseline
specification excluding observations after 2008. The coefficient on residential real estate is still highly
significant, and the point estimate is larger.
C.4 Using Transactions to Value a Director’s Home Address
C.4.1 Determining the Dates a Director Lives at a Property
For an address that has been matched to either Land Registry, we know all the transactions that
happen at a particular property since the registry started. The next step is to determine which trans-
actions correspond to the director buying and/or selling their property (recall that throughout this
paper we maintain that the director is the owner of the property). Figure 7 presents a diagrammatic
representation of the time line we envisage for determining the relevant transactions for a director’s
property. In the time line, two lines on the upper half of the time line show the dates of the first and
last vintage of the BvD database where the director lists that particular address as their property.
The lower half of the diagram shows two transactions. Transaction 1 is the first transaction
immediately prior to the address first being listed in BvD and will capture the director buying the
property. Transaction 2 is the first transaction immediately after the last vintage of BvD where the
director registered as living at the the address and will represent the director selling the property.
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Table 24: Firm Investment and the Real Estate Channels: Excluding Observations After 2008
Investment
Baseline
2002-2014 2002-2008
(1) (2)
Residential RE 0.0298*** 0.0422***
(0.011) (0.014)
Corporate RE 0.0511*** 0.0262
(0.017) (0.027)
Cash 0.0777*** 0.0961***
(0.012) (0.019)
Profits 0.1092*** 0.0889***
(0.016) (0.024)
Observations 32244 18958
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.27
Add. Firm, Dir. Controls Yes Yes
Region-time FE Yes Yes
Industry-time FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Firm region clustered standard errors in parentheses
?p < 0.10, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Notes: The table reports the link between residential real estate, corporate real estate, and firm investment. The sample covers reporting
UK firms over the period 2002-2014. The dependent variable, Investment, is defined as the change in “Fixed Assets” less “Depreciation”.
Residential RE is the total value of residential property held by directors of the firm, holding the composition of directors and their
properties fixed in 2002, updating the value through time with changes in their respective regional house price indices, as defined in
Equation 3.2. Corporate RE is the 2002 book value of firm Land and Buildings iterated forward using the regional house price index, as
defined in Equation 3.1. Cash and Profits enter with a lag. All of these variables are scaled by the lag of firm turnover. Add. Firm.
Dir. Controls comprises of quintiles for firm and director characteristics in 2002 interacted with the house price index in the firm region;
the firm’s regional house price index; and the inverse of lagged “Turnover” (see Section 4). All ratios are winsorized at the median ± 5
times the interquartile range. Standard errors, clustered by firm region, in parentheses. Column (1) is the baseline regression including all
controls and fixed effects. Column (2) runs the baseline regression from 2002-2008.
Figure 7: Time line for dating director property transactions: simple case
First vintage where 
the address is listed
Last vintage where 
the address is listed
Transaction 2: SaleTransaction 1: Purchase
107
There may be a “Transaction 0” in the registry, which corresponds to the person who the director
bought the property from in the first instance. There may also be a “Transaction 3”, where the next
owner after director sells the property on. And other transactions beyond that further down the
chain.
In our data, 80.3% of director addresses conform to this time line, where there is no transaction
between the first and last vintage where the address is listed in BvD. Note that Transaction 1 may
not exist in the Land Registry if the director bought the property sufficiently far in the past (5.8%
of addresses) and Transaction 2 may not exist if the director has not yet sold property (62.9% of
addresses). By elimination, for 11.6% of addresses no transaction occurs between the first and last
vintage and both Transaction 1 and 2 exist.
The other 19.7% of cases where there is an intermediate transaction can largely be explained
by lags in reporting. BvD retains directors in the database after they have resigned (whether the
director is currently at the company or has resigned is a field within our data) but firms have no
obligation to keep the address information up to date for directors who are no longer present. This
means that the last vintage of BvD where the director’s address is listed is not an accurate depiction
of when the director left the property.
Figure 8 provides a second time line detailing how this issue can emerge and how we address it.
In this case, rather than using the last vintage of BvD where the director registers that address, we
use the date of the last set of company accounts where the director both registers as living at the
address and has a current role at the company.58 This accounts for an additional 11.6% of addresses.
As a final step, we also extend the window to include transactions that occur a year prior to the final
account date where the director has a current role to allow for lags in the director reporting a new
address (2.9% of addresses).
This leaves 5.0% of addresses with transaction information that is inconsistent with BvD. We
wipe transaction information on these addresses and treat the observations as missing. However,
it is worth noting that for 2.2% out of those 5% of addresses (or just under half the addresses we
wipe) there is no vintage of BvD where a director lists those addresses at a firm where the director’s
58If the account date is missing we use the date of the last vintage of BvD where the director is listed as current
instead.
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Figure 8: Time line for dating director property transactions: complex case
role is current, i.e. the addresses predate the dataset. So it is not surprising that the transaction
information does not align.
C.4.2 Calculating the Value of Real Estate Held by a Director
We next value the real estate held by a director. Where a director’s address has been matched to
one of the Land Registries, we have an estimated purchase and/or sale date, with corresponding
purchase/sale prices. In addition, the director-address pair may be matched to the PSD mortgage
database, as described in Online Appendix D. This mortgage activity could correspond to the director
buying the house, or a subsequent remortgaging.
We use the house price index in the director’s region to value the house outside of transac-
tion/mortgaging dates. We pick a reference house value and date, and simply use the house price
index to value the property at other dates. In the first instance our preference is to use transaction
data for the reference value, as this records the actual transacted price for the house, in contrast
to the PSD, where the value of the house associated with a remortgage will be an estimated value.
Where we observe both a purchase and sale price for a director’s house, we use the purchase price as
this will be independent of the director’s subsequent behaviour.
This method uniquely values all the matched director properties at all dates in our dataset. To
avoid simultaneously counting the value of all properties a director has lived in at different times,
we set the value of each director-address pair to 0 outside of the estimated dates they lived at the
property. This allows us to accurately measure the value of real-estate owned by a director through
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Table 25: Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Directors
Mean Median 25%tile 75%tile
Variable Matched (M) Unmatched (U) M U M U M U
Director Age (Years) 47.37 52.13 46.32 52.75 39.73 44.40 54.33 60.13
Male Directors 0.695 0.641 1 1 0 0 1 1
Non-UK Directors 0.0594 0.129 0 0 0 0 0 0
Experience (Years) 7.063 6.844 5.583 5.333 2.833 2.750 9.917 9.667
No. Industries Worked In 1.500 1.376 1 1 1 1 2 2
Firms with at Birth 0.878 0.651 1 1 0 0 1 1
Firms that have Failed 0.378 0.263 0 0 0 0 1 0
Notes: The statistics are calculated for the directors of all live companies in England, Wales, and Scotland over the period 2002-2014.
Matched refers to directors whose address we are able to value through matching to either the Land Registries or the Product Sales
Database. Unmatched refers to directors whose address we are not able to value. Director variables are defined in Online Appendix B. All
variables except Male Directors and Non-UK Directors are truncated at the 5/95% levels.
time, including capturing house moves. For each director we then sum across the value of all matched
addresses at each date to calculate the total value of real estate held through time.
C.5 Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Directors
We next turn to the question of whether there is a significant difference between the characteristics
of the directors whose houses we are able to value from those we are not. Table 25 presents summary
statistics for a number of director characteristics broken down into directors whose address we can
value by matching to either the Land Registries or the Product Sales Database and those we cannot.
In general, the characteristics of the two groups are similar, with a few differences. First, directors
with unmatched houses tend to be older, with both the mean and median unmatched director being
around five years older. This is likely because older directors are less likely to have moved house
within the period of our transactions databases, and so we are unable to pick up a housing transaction
for their address. Second, non-UK nationals are less likely to be matched. This is unsurprising as
they are more likely to live abroad, and we are only able to match UK addresses. Finally, directors
with matched addresses tend to be slightly more experienced. This is likely because more experienced
directors will list their address across a greater number of our vintages and across a greater number
of companies, reducing the impact of typos in listing their address, and improving our chances of a
match.
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D Computing Housing Equity
This section explains how we estimate the housing equity held by directors, using transaction data
and mortgage data.
D.1 Matching Company Directors with Mortgage Contracts
The first step in calculating director home equity is to merge the directors in the BvD database with
a loan level database, known as the Product Sales Database (PSD), which covers the universe of
regulated mortgage originations in the UK since April 2005. While we cannot observe the name of
the mortgagor in PSD, we can see the date of birth of the mortgagor as well as the 6-digit postcode
of the property on which the mortgage was taken out. A 6-digit postcode in the UK has, on average,
17 properties attached it. Therefore, these two bits of information (postcode and date of birth) make
it very likely that we can uniquely match company directors from BvD with the mortgage contracts
they signed. We then look at the details of each mortgage contract and, from it, we compute the
dynamics of mortgage principal of each company director who has ever had a mortgage in our sample.
D.1.1 The Product Sales Database
The PSD contains information on the characteristics of mortgage contracts at origination, covering
more than 10,000,000 contracts. The database contains information on the loan size, date of orig-
ination, the valuation of the property, the type (fixed or variable rate) and terms of the mortgage,
the initial interest rate, the number of years over which the interest rate is fixed in case of a fixed-
rate mortgage, and the type of borrower (remortgagor with or without equity extraction, mover or
first-time buyer).
Missing Interest Rate Values Around 32% of mortgage contracts do no report interest rates in
the PSD database. Given that we have virtually full coverage on other contract characteristics, we
estimate an interest rate model in the spirit of Best et al. (2015) and use the estimated parameters
for out-of-sample prediction to fill in the missing interest rate values. The interest rate is modelled
as follows:
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ri = β1LTVi + β2lenderi + β3typei ⊗monthi + β4repaymenti
β5termi + s1 (agei) + s2 (incomei) + νi,
(D.1)
where ri is the mortgage rate for individual i. LTVi is a vector of dummies, each corresponding to
0.25%-point LTV bins, starting at the bin 54% and ending with the bin 99%. lenderi is a vector of
mortgage provider dummies. typei is a vector mortgage type dummies. We use 12 different types:
standard variable rate (SVR) mortgage, tracker mortgage, or fixed rate mortgage with an introductory
period of 1 year, 2 years,..., 10 years. monthi is vector of month-year dummies associated with the date
at which the mortgage was taken out. repaymenti is a dummy controlling for whether the mortgage
is capital-and-interest or interest-only. termi is a vector of dummies capturing the mortgage term.
s1 and s2 are cubic splines with knots at the quintiles of the distribution of age and income and ⊗
denotes the outer product. Given the reasonably good fit (adjusted R2 = 0.81, N ≈ 9.8 million) of
the estimated interest rate model D.1, we use the estimates to fill in the missing interest rate values
via out-of-sample forecasting. We winsorize the fitted values at 0%-points and 15%-points. For the
remaining missing interest rate values (because of missing values for some of the RHS variables in
D.1) we use the 2-year 75% LTV mortgage rate at the time of origination.59
D.1.2 Mortgage Principal Calculation
The schedule of a mortgage loan (i.e. the dynamics of the principal over the life of the mortgage)
with initial loan amount L, monthly interest rate i, and fixed monthly repayment M can be written
as, at month k since origination:
Pk = (1 + i)k L−
[
1 + (1 + i) + (1 + i)2 + · · ·+ (1 + i)k−1
]
M, (D.2)
where the polynomial can be simplified as 1 + (1 + i) + (1 + i)2 + · · · + (1 + i)k−1 = (1+i)k−1
i
. The
monthly repayment M is calculated by setting the principal in the final period (N) to zero:
M = i
(1 + i)N − 1L (1 + i)
N . (D.3)
59This affects less than 1% of the sample.
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Substituting D.3 into D.2 yields an expression of the principal at any point of time, which is a (non-
linear) function of the monthly interest rate on the mortgage, the mortgage term and the initial loan
amount. After rearranging, the principal k periods after origination can be written as60:
Pk =
[
(1 + i)N − (1 + i)k
(1 + i)N − 1
]
L. (D.4)
D.2 Calculating Residential Equity
For the England & Wales Land Registry we have a variable that indicates, for the period 2002-2014,
whether a property was bought with a mortgage or not. We combine this information with mortgage
information from the PSD and information on the house value to estimate the equity a director
has in their house. In calculating this, we take the first available observation on home equity for a
director, and calculate the evolution of home equity assuming no future remortgaging activity. This
is to avoid potential endogeneity issues that may arise from subsequent mortgage decisions being
correlated with firm performance.
Where the Land Registry dataset indicates that the director’s property was bought without a
mortgage, and any matched mortgage contract for the director-address pair in the PSD occurs after
the month of purchase, the director’s principal is calculated as 0 for all dates. In this case the property
is bought without a mortgage, and we abstract from the subsequent mortgage activity, which could
be endogenous to firm behaviour, e.g. if the director remortgages their property to inject equity into
their firm. In all other cases we apply Equation D.4 to the first observable mortgage contract of the
60In practice, formula D.4 together with the interest rate i are applied to compute monthly payments for mortgages
whose terms are typically much longer than the initial period to which the fixed interest rate applies. In the UK, the
initial period usually lasts for two years after which the mortgage provider sets a floating interest rate that is typically
much higher than the fixed interest rate used in the introductory period. This can be avoided by the borrower
remortgaging at the end of the initial period. Mortgagors have a strong incentive to do that so that they avoid paying
the higher floating rate. In addition, they can also potentially get a better deal and lock in a more favorable fixed
rate if the property has increased in value during the initial period and, as a result, the borrower falls in a lower LTV
bucket at the time of remortgaging.
In light of this, we also experimented with an alternative method of calculating principal, whereby we used all
subsequent information (following the first observable mortgage decision) available to us. This includes all additional
remortgaging decisions in the flow of mortgages (PSD 001), and we also used data on the stock of mortgages (PSD
007), which covers the outstanding stock of regulated residential mortgages at a point in time (we used H2 2015 as
it is the first available vintage of this dataset). In effect, we aimed at computing principal and equity dynamics that
have the highest possible degree of accuracy, often making use of information contained in the stock of mortgages as
of 2015. When using this alternative method, we did not find any material difference in the investment sensitivity of
firms to residential home equity values. These results are available upon request.
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director in the PSD, ignoring information contained in subsequent remortgaging decisions.
Our measure of residential equity for firm i at time t is then computed as
Residential Equityi,t =
Ni
(N̂i)
N̂i∑
d=1
(
Ldi.t − P di,t
)
, (D.5)
where Ldi.t is the home value of director d at firm i at time t, calculated as described in Online
Appendix C.4.2; P di,t is the mortgage principal for director d at firm i at time t, as described above;
Ni is the number of directors in firm i, and N̂i is the number of directors in firm i whose home equity
we can calculate.
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E Model
E.1 The Full Model
The model builds on previous models with corporate collateral constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Liu et al. (2013), Pinter (2015) and Liu et al. (2016), and models with household collateral
constraints as in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The model is infinite horizon
and is in discrete time. The economy features two types of agents: a representative household and
a representative entrepreneur. The household consumes and saves through a one-period riskless
discount bond. The entrepreneur consumes, produces, hires household labour, purchases capital,
residential and commercial land which it partly finances with credit, collateralised with their capital
stock, residential and commercial land holdings. The model description follows closely the notation
of Liu et al. (2013), Pinter (2015) and Liu et al. (2016).
E.1.1 Household
The representative household maximises the utility function:
U = E0
∞∑
s=0
βsAt+s {log (Ch,t+s − hhCh,t+s−1) + ϕt+s logLh,t+s − ψt+sNt+s} , (E.1)
where Ch,t denotes consumption and hh is the degree of internal habit formation. The parameter β
is the subjective discount factor, and the intertemporal preference shock At follows the stationary
process:
At = At−1 (1 + λa,t) , ln λa,t = (1− ρa) ln λ¯a + ρa ln λa,t−1 + εa,t. (E.2)
The parameter λ¯a > 0 is a constant, ρa is the degree of persistence. The innovation εa is iid with
variance σ2a. Moreover Lh,t is residential real estate of the household with the corresponding taste
shifter ϕt. This land demand shock follows the stationary process:
lnϕt = (1− ρϕ) ln ϕ¯+ ρϕ lnϕt−1 + σϕεϕ,t, (E.3)
115
where ϕ¯ > 0 is a constant, ρϕ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the land demand shock, σϕ is
the standard deviation of the i.i.d innovation εϕ,t. The labour supply shock ψt follows the stationary
process:
lnψt = (1− ρψ) ln ψ¯ + ρψ lnψt−1 + σψεψ,t, (E.4)
where ψ¯ > 0 is a constant, ρψ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence and σψ is the standard deviation
of the i.i.d innovation εψ,t. The flow-of-funds constraint of the representative household is:
Ch,t + ql,t (Lh,t − Lh,t−1) + St
Rt
= WtNt + St−1, (E.5)
where Rt is the gross riskfree return, St is the purchase in period t of the loanable bond that pays off
one unit of consumption good in all states of the world in period t + 1, which is known in advance.
In period 0, the household starts with S−1 > 0 units of the loanable bonds. The household’s problem
is to choose a sequence {Ch,t, St, Lh,t}∞t=0 to maximise its utility.
E.1.2 Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur’s utility function is written as:
U = E0
∞∑
s=0
βs {log (Ce,t+s − heCe,t+s−1) + υ logLr,t+s} , (E.6)
where Ce,t denotes the entrepreneur’s consumption, he is the habit persistence Lr,t is residential land
and υ is a scale parameter. The entrepreneur is the producer in this economy, and the produc-
tion function Yt is a function of physical capital (Kt ), entrepreneurial commercial land (Lc,t) and
household labour (Nt):
Yt = Zt
[
K1−κt−1 L
κ
c,t−1
]α
N1−αt , (E.7)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and κ ∈ (0, 1) are the output elasticities of the production factors. The total factor
productivity Zt is composed of a permanent component Zpt and a transitory component νt such that
Zt = Zpt νz,t, where the permanent component Zpt follows the stochastic process:
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Zpt = Zpt−1λz,t, ln λz,t = (1− ρz) ln λ¯z + ρz ln λz,t−1 + εz,t, (E.8)
and the transitory component follows the stochastic process:
ln νz,t = ρνz ln νz,t−1 + ενz ,t. (E.9)
The parameter λ¯z is the steady-state growth rate of Zpt , the parameters ρz and ρνz measure the degree
of persistence. The innovations εz,t and ενz ,t are iid with variances σ2z and σ2νz . The entrepreneur is
endowed with K−1 units of initial capital stock and L−1,e units of land. Capital accumulation follows
the law of motion:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
1− Ω2
(
It
It−1
− λ¯l
)2 It, (E.10)
where It denotes investment, λ¯l denotes the steady-state growth rate of investment, and Ω > 0 is the
adjustment cost parameter. The entrepreneur faces the following flow-of-funds constraint:
Ce,t + ql,t [(Lc,t − Lc,t−1) + (Lr,t − Lr,t−1)] +Bt−1 = Yt + Bt
Rt
− It
Qt
−WtNt, (E.11)
where Bt−1 is the amount of matured entrepreneurial debt and Bt/Rt is the value of new debt.
Following Greenwood et al. (1997), Qt is the investment-specific technological change, defined as
Qt = Qptνq,t, where the permanent component Qpt follows the stochastic process:
Qpt = Qpt−1λq,t, ln λq,t = (1− ρq) ln λ¯q + ρq ln λq,t−1 + εq,t, (E.12)
and the transitory component follows the stochastic process:
ln νq,t = ρνq ln νq,t−1 + ενq ,t. (E.13)
The parameter λ¯q is the steady-state growth rate of Qpt , the parameters ρq and ρνq measure the degree
of persistence. The innovations εq,t and ενq ,t are iid with variances σ2q and σ2νq . The entrepreneur’s
ability to obtain credit subject to the following collateral constraint:
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Bt ≤ θtEt [ql,t+1 (ω1Lc,t + ω2Lr,t) + ω3qk,t+1Kt] , (E.14)
where qk,t+1 is the shadow value of capital in consumption units, also referred to as Tobin’s q, and
ω parameters capture the pledgeability of the assets. The credit constraint E.14 limits the amount
of borrowing by a fraction of the gross value of the collateralisible assets - land and capital. As in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the credit constraint reflects problems of limited contract enforceability.
The θt is a shock to the collateral constraint (Jermann and Quadrini (2012)) which is written as:
ln θt = (1− ρθ) ln θ + ρθ ln θt−1 + σθεθ,t (E.15)
where θ is the steady-state value of θt, and ρθ ∈ (0.1) is the persistence parameter, and εθ,t is iid with
variance σ2θ . The entrepreneur’s problem is to choose a sequence {Ce,t, Bt, Nt, Kt, It, Lc,t, Lr,t}∞t=0 to
maximise utility.
E.1.3 Market Clearing
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labour, land and bonds all clear. The goods
market clearing condition is:
Ch,t + Ce,t +
It
Qt
= Yt. (E.16)
The land market clearing condition implies:
Lh,t + Lr,t + Lc,t = L¯, (E.17)
where L¯ is the fixed aggregate land endowment. Finally, the bond market clearing condition implies:
St = Bt. (E.18)
A competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of prices {Wt, ql,t, Rt}∞t=0 and allocation of quantities
{Ch,t, Ce,t, It, Nt, Lh,t, Lr,t, Lc,t, St, Bt, Kt, Yt}∞t=0 such that taking prices as given, the allocations solve
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the optimising problems for the household and the entrepreneur, and all markets clear.
E.2 Stationary Equilibrium
We transform the trending variables into their stationary counterparts (denoted by )˜.61
E.2.1 Household
λ˜h,t =
1
C˜h,t − hhC˜h,t−1Γt−1/Γt
− Et βhh
C˜h,t+1Γt+1/Γt − hhC˜h,t
(1 + λa,t+1)
1
Rt
= βEt
λ˜h,t+1
λ˜h,t
Γt
Γt+1
(1 + λa,t+1)
w˜t =
ψt
λ˜h,t
q˜l,t = βEt
λ˜h,t+1
λ˜h,t
(1 + λa,t+1) q˜l,t+1 +
ϕt
λ˜h,tLh,t
.
(E.19)
E.2.2 Entrepreneur
λ˜e,t =
1
C˜e,t − heC˜e,t−1Γt−1/Γt
− Et βhe
C˜e,t+1Γt+1/Γt − heC˜e,t
w˜t = (1− α) Y˜t
Nt
1
Rt
= βEt
λ˜e,t+1
λ˜e,t
Γt
Γt+1
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
1 = q˜k,t
1− Ω2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
− λ¯I
)2
− Ω
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
− λ¯I
)
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1

+ ΩβEt
λ˜e,t+1
λ˜e,t
QtΓt
Qt+1Γt+1
q˜k,t+1
(
I˜t+1
I˜t
Qt+1Γt+1
QtΓt
− λ¯I
)(
I˜t+1
I˜t
Qt+1Γt+1
QtΓt
)2
K˜t = (1− δ) K˜t−1 QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
+
1− Ω2
(
I˜t
I˜t−1
QtΓt
Qt−1Γt−1
− λ¯I
)2 I˜t
(E.20)
q˜k,t = βEt
λ˜e,t+1
λ˜e,t
[
α (1− κ) Y˜t+1
K˜t
+ q˜k,t
QtΓt
Qt+1Γt+1
(1− δ)
]
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
Etθtq˜k,t+1ω3
Qt
Qt+1
q˜l,t = βEt
λ˜e,t+1
λ˜e,t
[
ακ
Y˜t+1
Lc,t
+ q˜l,t+1
]
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
Etθtq˜l,t+1ω1
Γt+1
Γt
q˜l,t = βEt
λ˜e,t+1
λ˜e,t
q˜l,t+1 +
υ
λ˜e,tLr,t
+ µ˜e,t
λ˜e,t
Etθtq˜l,t+1ω2
Γt+1
Γt
.
(E.21)
61See Liu et al. (2013) for further details.
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E.2.3 The Rest of the Model
Y˜t =
(
ZtQt
Zt−1Qt−1
)− (1−κ)α1−(1−κ)α [
K˜1−κt−1 L
κ
c,t−1
]α
N1−αt
Y˜t = C˜h,t + C˜e,t + I˜t
L¯ = Lh,t + Lc,t + Lr,t
B˜t = θtEt
[
q˜l,t+1 (ω1Lc,t + ω2Lr,t)
Γt+1
Γt
+ q˜k,t+1ω3Kt
Qt
Qt+1
]
.
(E.22)
E.3 Steady-state
Here we derive the model’s steady-states. The interest rate and shadow prices are:
1
R
=
β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
gγ
µ˜e
λ˜e
= βλ¯a
gγ
.
(E.23)
The marginal utility of consumption of the two agents:
λ˜h =
1
C˜h
gγ − β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
hh
gγ − hh

λ˜e =
1
C˜e
[
gγ − βhe
gγ − he
]
.
(E.24)
To get the ratio of commercial land to output, use the entrepreneur’s commercial land Euler-equation
and the definition E.23:
q˜lLe
Y˜
= ακβ
1− β − βλ¯aω1θ
. (E.25)
So the parameter κ is given by:
κ =
q˜lLe
Y˜
(
1− β − βλ¯aω1θ
)
αβ
, (E.26)
whereas the scale parameter α is given by capital demand:
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α =
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
β/gγ
− (1− δ)
gγ (1− φ)
K˜
Y˜
. (E.27)
Given the target values for the steady-state K˜
Y˜
, q˜lLc
Y˜
and q˜lLe
Y˜
, equations E.26–E.27 pin down κ and α.
The steady-state investment-output ratio can be matched by choosing the appropriate value for δ:
I˜
K˜
= 1− 1− δ
λk
. (E.28)
Using the definition of the return on capital, the steady-state capital-output ratio is:
K˜
Y˜
= β [α (1− κ)]
1− β
λk
[
λ¯aθω3 + (1− δ)
] .
The investment-output ratio is:
I˜
Y˜
= I˜
K˜
K˜
Y˜
=
βα (1− φ)
[
1− 1−δ
λk
]
1− β
λk
(
λ¯aθω3 + 1− δ
) . (E.29)
The corporate debt to output ratio is:
B
Y
= θgγ q˜l
(
ω1
Le
Y˜
+ ω2
Lr
Y˜
)
+ ω3
θ
λ¯q
K˜
Y˜
.
The entrepreneurial consumption to output ratio is:
C˜e
Y˜
= α− I˜
Y˜
− 1− β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
gγ
B˜e
Y˜
. (E.30)
The household consumption to output ratio is:
C˜h
Y˜
= 1− C˜e
Y˜
− I˜
Y˜
.
The preference parameter ν is given by:
q˜lLr
C˜e
= ν (gγ − he)
gγ (1− βhe/gγ)
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω2
) . (E.31)
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The preference parameter ϕh is given by:
qlLh
C˜h
= ϕh (gγ − hh)
gγ (1− gγ/R) (1− hγ/R) .
The relative land shares Lh
Le
and Lr
Le
are written as:
Lh
Le
=
ϕh (gγ − hh)
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω1
)
gγακβ (1− gγ/R) (1− hγ/R)
C˜h
Y˜
Lr
Le
=
ν (gγ − he)
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω1
)
gγακβ (1− βhe/gγ)
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω2
) C˜e
Y˜
.
E.4 The Log-linearised System
Given the steady-states and the defined constants Ωh ≡
(
gγ − β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
hh
)
(gγ − hh) and Ωe ≡
(gγ − βhe) (gγ − he), the log-linearised first-order conditions are:
Ωˆhλˆh = −
[
g2γ + h2hβ
(
1 + λ¯a
)]
Cˆh,t + gγhh
(
Cˆh,t−1 − gˆγ,t
)
− βλ¯ahh (gγ − hh)Etλˆa,t+1 + β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
gγhhEt
(
Cˆh,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
Ωˆeλˆe = −
[
g2γ + h2eβ
]
Cˆe,t + gγhe
(
Cˆe,t−1 − gˆγ,t
)
+ βgγheEt
(
Cˆe,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
λˆe,t − Rˆt = 11 + λ¯a
[
Et
(
λˆe,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1
)
+ λ¯aµˆe,t
]
λˆh,t − Rˆt = Et
[
λˆh,t+1 +
λ¯a
1 + λ¯a
λˆa,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1
]
qˆk,t = Ωλ2k
[
(1 + β) Iˆt − Iˆt−1
]
+ Ωλ2k (gˆq,t + gˆγ,t)− βΩλ2kEt
[
Iˆt+1 + gˆq,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
]
qˆl,t + λˆh,t = β
(
1 + λ¯a
)
Et
(
λˆh,t+1 + qˆl,t+1
)
+
[
1− β
(
1 + λ¯a
)] (
ϕˆt − Lˆh,t
)
+ βλ¯aEtλˆa,t+1
wˆt + λˆh,t = ψˆt
wˆt + Nˆt = Yˆt
(E.32)
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qˆl,t + λˆe,t = βEt
(
λˆe,t+1 + qˆl,t+1
)
+
[
1− β
(
1 + λ¯a
)] (
ϕˆt − Lˆr,t
)
qˆl,t + λˆe,t = βEt
(
qˆl,t+1 + λˆe,t+1
)
+ µ˜e
λ˜e
θω2gγ
(
µˆe,t + θˆt + qˆl,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
+
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω2
)
Et
[
−Lˆr,t
]
qˆl,t + λˆe,t =
µ˜e
λ˜e
θω1gγEt
(
µˆe,t + θˆt + qˆl,t+1 + gˆγ,t+1
)
+
(
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
gγθω1
)
Etλˆe,t+1
+ βEtqˆl,t+1 +
(
1− β − βλ¯aθω1
)
Et
[
Yˆt+1 − Lˆe,t
]
qˆk,t + λˆe,t =
µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
λ¯q
ω3Et
(
µˆe,t + θˆt + qˆk,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1
)
+ β (1− δ)
λk
Et (qˆk,t+1 − gˆq,t+1 − gˆγ,t+1)
+
(
1− µ˜e
λ˜e
θ
λ¯q
ω3
)
Etλˆe,t+1 + βα (1− κ) Y˜
K˜
Et
(
Yˆt+1 − Kˆt
)
.
(E.33)
The log-linearised equations for the rest of the model:
Yˆt = ακLˆe,t−1 + α (1− κ) Kˆt−1 + (1− α) Nˆt − (1− κ)α1− (1− κ)α [gˆz,t + gˆq,t]
Kˆt =
1− δ
λk
[
Kˆt−1 − gˆγ,t − gˆq,t
]
+
(
1− 1− δ
λk
)
Iˆt
Yˆt =
C˜h
Y˜
Cˆh,t +
C˜e
Y˜
Cˆe,t +
I˜
Y˜
Iˆt
0 = Lh
L¯
Lˆh,t +
Le
L¯
Lˆe,t +
Lr
L¯
Lˆr,t
αYˆt =
C˜e
Y˜
Cˆe,t +
I˜
Y˜
Iˆt +
q˜lLe
Y˜
(
Lˆe,t − L˜e,t−1
)
+ q˜lLr
Y˜
(
Lˆr,t − L˜r,t−1
)
+ 1
gγ
B˜
Y˜
(
Bˆt−1 − gˆγ,t
)
− 1
R
B˜
Y˜
(
Bˆt − Rˆt
)
Bˆt = θˆt + θ
q˜lLc
B
ω1gγ
(
qˆl,t+1 + Lˆc,t + gˆγ,t
)
+ θ q˜lLr
B
ω2gγ
(
qˆl,t+1 + Lˆr,t + gˆγ,t
)
+
(
1− θ q˜lgγ
B
(ω1Lc + ω2Lr)
) (
qˆk,t+1 + Kˆt + gˆq,t
)
.
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The terms gˆz,t, gˆq,t and gˆγ,t are given by:
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gˆz,t = λˆz,t + νˆz,t − νˆz,t−1
gˆq,t = λˆq,t + νˆq,t − νˆq,t−1
gˆγ,t =
1
1− (1− κ)αgˆz,t +
(1− κ)α
1− (1− κ)αgˆq,t.
(E.35)
The technology shocks follow the processes:
λˆz,t = ρzλˆz,t−1 + εˆz,t
λˆq,t = ρqλˆq,t−1 + εˆq,t
νˆz,t = ρνz νˆz,t−1 + εˆνz ,t
νˆq,t = ρνq νˆq,t−1 + εˆνq ,t.
(E.36)
The other shocks follow the processes:
ϕˆt = ρϕϕˆt−1 + εˆϕ,t
ψˆt = ρψψˆt−1 + εˆψ,t
θˆt = ρθθˆt−1 + εˆθ,t
λˆa,t = ρaλˆa,t−1 + εˆa,t.
(E.37)
E.5 Model Estimation
E.5.1 Data
The baseline DSGE model is estimated on six UK aggregate time series: real house prices (qdatal,t ), the
inverse of the relative price of investment (qdatat ), real per capita investment (Idatat ), real per capita
consumption (Cdatat ), lending to corporates (Bdatat ), working hours (Ndatat ). The sample covers the
period from 1975:Q3 to 2015:Q1. The observable series are defined as follows:
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qdatal,t =
Nationwide
cdef
qdatat =
cdef
idef
Idatat =
inv
popindex
Cdatat =
(pcons− imprent− actrent) /cdef
popindex
Bdatat =
Bcorp/cdef
popindex
Ndatat =
TotalHours
popindex
Nationwide: Seasonally adjusted house price index of all houses, derived from Nationwide lending
data for properties at the post survey approval stage.
cdef : Quarterly private consumption deflator, seasonally adjusted (constructed using ONS codes:
(ABJQ + HAYE)/ (ABJR + HAYO)).
idef : Quarterly total gross fixed capital formation deflator, seasonally adjusted (constructed using
ONS codes: (NPQS+NPJQ)/(NPQT+NPJR)). We use the 2011:Q3 vintage of this series updated
to 2015 using the latest (2015:Q4) vintage. We take this step in order to omit R&D prices from the
data. The ONS changed the treatment of R&D expenditure from intermediate consumption to gross
fixed capital formation as part the implementation of ESA2010 in 2014. As a result, in the latest
vintage of the UK national accounts, relative investment prices no longer display the downward trend
prevalent in other countries. Our use of an earlier vintage is to capture shifts in the relative price
of tangible capital only, which is more closely aligned with the model definition (not least because
intangible capital is much harder to collateralise).
popindex : The index of the UK working age (16+) population (source: LFS and ONS; code:
MGSL).
inv: Total gross fixed capital formation, seasonally adjusted, at constant prices, £m (source:
ONS; code: NPQT).
pcons: Private final consumption expenditure, seasonally adjusted, at current prices, £m (source:
ONS; constructed using codes: ABJQ+HAYE).
imprent: Household consumption of imputed rents, seasonally adjusted, at current prices, £m
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(source: ONS; code: GBFJ).
actrent: Household consumption of actual rents, seasonally adjusted, at current prices, £m
(source: ONS; code: ZAVP).
Bcorp: Quarterly amounts outstanding of monetary financial institutions’ (MFI) sterling net
lending to private non-financial corporations, seasonally adjusted, at current prices, £m. (source:
Bank of England Interactive Database, code: LPQBC57).
TotalHours: Total actual weekly hours worked, seasonally adjusted, millions (source: ONS; code:
YBUS).
All national accounts data are from the 2015:Q4 vintage unless otherwise stated.
E.5.2 Steady State Calibration
To calibrate the steady state of the model we make use of five ratios observable in the data. Some of
the key details in the UK national account estimates of sectoral non-financial balance sheets are only
available from 1997 onwards. Hence, our approach is to compute the ratios on an annual basis and
take the average over the 1997-2014 period for the purpose of calibration. Where the ratio is defined
as a stock over a flow, we multiply the ratio by four to convert back to a quarterly frequency. We
use data in current prices. Let variables without time subscripts denote steady state values.
Capital to output ratio (K/Y ) = 3.91. Capital is defined as total economy fixed assets less
dwellings and less buildings other than dwellings. Output is defined as total economy gross value
added. Government purchases are excluded from the ratio. The entrepreneur’s subjective discount
rate β is set to deliver this ratio.
Investment to capital ratio (I/K) = 0.045. Capital is defined as above. Investment is defined
as total economy gross fixed capital formation. Government purchases are excluded from the ratio.
The depreciation rate δ is set to deliver this ratio.
Entrepreneurial land to output ratio qlLc/Y = 2.31. Corporate land is defined as the total
economy dwellings plus total economy buildings other than dwellings less dwellings owned by the
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household and government sectors. Output is defined as above. The production scale parameter κ
is set to deliver this ratio.
Residential land to output ratio ql(Lh +Lr)/Y = 10.68. Residential land is defined as the total
value of dwellings owned by the household sector. Output is defined as above. The utility scale
parameter ϕ¯ is set to deliver this ratio.
Entrepreneurial share of residential land Lr/(Lh + Lr) = 0.25 which is set following the dis-
cussion in Section 6. The utility scale parameter ν is set to deliver this ratio.
Loan to value ratio θ = 0.78. We define the total value of corporate debt as the loan and debt
security liabilities of the non-financial corporate sector. As the denominator, we use total fixed assets
of the non-financial corporate sector.
E.5.3 Estimated Model Parameters
Table 26 summarises the results from the Bayesian estimation of the model. A system of measurement
equations links the observables, defined in Subsection E.5.1 above, to the state variables. We use
Dynare 4.4.2 to perform the estimation. First we use the Kalman-filter to construct the likelihood
function. After combining the likelihood with the priors we use numerical optimisers to maximise the
posterior kernel. Using the modes of the maximised posterior kernel as starting points, we employ
the Metropolis Hastings algorithm to simulate 100,000 random draws to approximate the shape of
the posterior distributions.
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Table 26: MCMC Results: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution a b Median Low High
hh Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.0394 0.0000 0.0762
he Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.5228 0.1428 0.7715
Ω Gamma(a,b) 1.00 0.50 0.2561 0.2103 0.2991
100 (gγ − 1) Gamma(a,b) 1.86 3.01 0.1874 0.0212 0.3795
100
(
λ¯q − 1
)
Gamma(a,b) 1.86 3.01 0.1652 0.0494 0.3043
ρz Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.5589 0.3821 0.7160
ρνz Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.1849 0.0000 0.4093
ρq Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.3730 0.0000 0.6535
ρνq Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.0355 0.0000 0.1118
ρϕ Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998
ρa Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.8611 0.8323 0.8884
ρθ Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.9811 0.9763 0.9859
ρψ Beta(a,b) 1.00 2.00 0.9842 0.9787 0.9902
ω3 Gamma(a,b) 1.00 1.00 0.6683 0.5750 0.7559
σz Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0069 0.0052 0.0087
σνz Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0062 0.0048 0.0076
σq Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0077 0.0045 0.0125
σνq Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0099 0.0073 0.0120
σϕ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0517 0.0457 0.0585
σa Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.1287 0.0906 0.1675
σθ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0149 0.0130 0.0164
σψ Inv-Gam(a,b) 0.3261 1.45e-04 0.0076 0.0068 0.0084
Note: The parameters a and b denote the shape and scale parameters of the corresponding prior distributions. The
High and Low columns refer to the posterior probability intervals at the 90% level, obtained by running 100,000 MCMC
chains from the posterior simulation.
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